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INTRODUCTION

Despite recent setbacks, United Nations peacekeeping and peace
enforcement will continue to present great long term potential for dealing with conflict situations. As a consequence, ongoing and future
deployments of U.N. armed forces will continue to raise the subject of
U.N. compliance with the laws of war. Officers of the United Nations

* Senior Fellow, Center for International Studies, New York University School of Law.
LL.M., New York University School of Law (1995); J.D., New York University School of
Law (1985). The author would like to thank Professors Gregory H. Fox, Pierre Klein, Andrew
Strauss, and Paul Szasz for their comments. The Author would also like to thank Professor
Thomas M. Franck, Director of the Center for International Studies, and the Ford Foundation
for their support during the preparation of this article. The author bears sole responsibility for
the contents of this article.
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concede that U.N. military forces are subject to some form of customary
international humanitarian law (IHL). In practice, however, the United
Nations treats the subject as a political issue and not as a fundamental
legal obligation. Resistance to the application of IHL to U.N. armed
forces is driven by the belief that it will hinder the U.N. mission to
promote peace and security and undermine the Organization's role, such
as it is, as a regulator of the international order situated above the
horizontal plane on which other subjects of international law act. The
question of U.N. compliance with IHL is a serious one. Allegations of
IHL violations by U.N. military forces include murder, torture, rape, and
pillage.'
The United Nations has asserted a number of legal arguments that
undercut its obligations as a subject of IHL. By implication, these
arguments represent a repudiation of the IHL premise that each human
person must be treated with at least a minimum amount of care and that
this duty of minimum treatment be made superior to utilitarian goals,
even where those utilitarian goals address the maintenance of international peace and security. It is essential that the United Nations tangibly
establish its commitment to IHL in order to deter future violations by its
forces. Even from the utilitarian perspective of U.N. effectiveness, the
.vigorous implementation of IHL by U.N. forces will promote, not
compromise, the accomplishment of U.N. political and military goals.
In Part I, I will discuss the normative framework in which U.N.
humanitarian obligations are established. In Part II, I will explain why
the application of IHL to U.N. armed forces will not compromise the
effectiveness of U.N. missions by deconstructing a number of specific
arguments put forward by the Organization that challenge the applicabil1. Members of a Canadian troop contingent forming part of the U.N. force in Somalia

are alleged to have tortured and killed a Somalia teenager in 1993. See Clyde H. Farnsworth,
CanadianShock Troops: Elite Corps DisbandedAfter Abuses Disclosed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1995, § 4, at 2.

Members of a Canadian, New Zealand, French, Ukrainian, and African country contingent allegedly engaged in sex with women being held against their will by Serbian irregulars
in the former Yugoslavia. Witnesses alleged that young Muslim or Croat women were forced
into U.N. armored personnel vehicles or civilian cars. See U.N. Troops Frequented Sex Slave
Den, Report Claims, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 1, 1993, at A2; Francis Harris, Peacekeepers
Accused of Using Bosnian Sex Slaves, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 2, 1993, at 14.

Members of a Bulgarian military contingent forming part of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) allegedly engaged in rape, pillage, and assault on
civilians, all of which went unpunished. Sisterhood Is Global, Ms., Jan./Feb. 1993, at 10; Dr.
Roy S. Lee, Remarks at the Eleventh Annual Seminar on International Humanitarian Law for
Diplomats Accredited to the United Nations (Jan. 20, 1994) (notes on file with the author)
[hereinafter Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee (I)]. M&lecins Sans Fronti~res (MSF), a French
humanitarian assistance organization, accused U.N. forces of beating and stealing from Somali
civilians. See Mark Huband, UN Troops in Somalia Accused of Lying to Hide Rights Abuses,
GUARDIAN,

July 30, 1993, at 1.

Fall 19951

HumanitarianLaw and U.N. Armed Forces

ity or conflict with the basic premises of the existing IHL regime. This
article concludes that the United Nations is bound by the rules of customary international humanitarian law, and occupies a horizontal relationship with the other subjects of IHL that it engages in armed conflict.
When U.N. armed forces engage in armed conflict, the Organization
qualifies as a "party to armed conflict" within the meaning of IHL, and
U.N. troops also fall within the IHL definition of "combatants," rendering the Organization subject to IHL obligations. Continuing U.N. arguments to the contrary either deprive IHL definitions of their determinacy
or regress to a claim of undeserved special status for Charter norms and
for the Organization. Moreover, with respect to U.N. intervention in
civil wars, the existing allocation of law-making authority between
sovereign states, on one hand, and the international order, on the other,
leaves individual states and the United Nations without the authority to
assert the civil war IHL regime. As a consequence, U.N. forces intervening in civil conflict are bound by the full IHL regime and must recognize in all hostile combatants the "combatant's privilege" and prisoner
of war status. Finally, U.N. obligations under IHL cannot be satisfied by
troop contributing states. By virtue of U.N. command and control, the
United Nations alone is responsible under IHL for the conduct of its
forces, because only an authority that exerts command and control over
troops can require that those troops comply with IHL obligations, a
position supported. by the draft code of state responsibility and the
International Court of Justice. The contrary notion - that troop contributing states could be directly responsible for actions taken under U.N.
command and control - would cripple the effectiveness of any U.N.
force by creating an incentive for contributing states to interfere with
and compromise U.N. operations. Ultimately, humanitarian law obligations may require that the international community modify the way in
which peacekeeping and peacemaking operations are structured.
I. THE APPLICABILITY OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW (IHL) TO U.N. ARMED FORCES:
NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK

Representatives of the United Nations acknowledge that United
Nations armed forces 2 are legally bound by at least some form of cus-

2. A "United Nations armed force," whether constituted under Chapter VI or VII of the
Charter, is a subsidiary organ of the United Nations comprised of contingents furnished by
member states but integrated into a chain of command under the orders of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral. This structure is evidenced by UNOSOM II (Somalia), ONUC (Congo), and UNEF
I (Sinai). For UNOSOM, see S.C. Res. 814, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3188th mtg. at 5, U.N.
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tomary international humanitarian law,3 the international law rules which

Doc. S/RES/814 (1993); Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of
Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., IN 78-88, U.N.
Doc. S/25354 (1993); for ONUC, see S.C. Res. S/4387, U.N. SCOR, 12th Sess., Supp. for
July-Sept. 1960, at 16, U.N. Doc. S/4387 (1960); Regulations Governing United Nations
Force in the Congo (ONUC), U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., i 5-6, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/ONUC/I
(1963), reprinted in 3 ROSALYN HIGGINS, UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 1946-1967:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 71 (1980); and for UNEF I (Sinai), see Letter from the U.N.
Secretary-General to Troop Contributing States, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Annex 1, Agenda
Item 65(c), U.N. Doc. A/3943 (1958); see also Model Agreement Between the United Nations
and Member States Contributing Personnel and Equipment to United Nations Peace-Keeping
4, U.N. Doc.
Operations: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess.,
A/46/185 (1991) [hereinafter Model Agreement]. During their period of assignment to the
force, individual members of each national contingent are considered U.N. personnel and
subject to U.N. rules prohibiting the seeking or accepting of instructions from their governments. See Oscar Schachter, Legal Aspects of the United Nations Action in the Congo, 55 AM.
J. INT'L L. 1, 11 (1961).
In contrast to the foregoing arrangement, operations may be conducted by non-U.N.
forces acting under the command of one or more states, pursuant to an authorization of the
Organization, as for example, under U.S. command in the cases of UNITAF (Somalia), Iraq,
and Korea. For UNITAF, see S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg. H 3-4,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (1992); Letter Dated 29 November 1992 from the Secretary-General
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc.
S/24868 (1992); for Iraq, see S.C. Res. 662, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2934th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/662 (1990); S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2938th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/665 (1990); S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/678
(1990); and for Korea, see S.C. Res. 83, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 474th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/1511 (1950); S.C. Res. 84, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., 476th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/1588 (1950);
see also SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR 32-33
(1966); Richard R. Baxter, The Role of Law in Modern War, 47 PROC. AM. SOC'v INT'L L.
90, 97 (1953).
The contingents comprising a U.N. armed force retain their national character and
individual national commanders and remain "subject to the military rules and regulations of
their respective national States without derogating from their responsibilities as members of
the Force as defined in these [the relevant U.N.] Regulations[.]" Regulations Governing
United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC), supra, I 29(c); see Model Agreement, supra,
U 9, 12, 25. Professor Seyersted characterizes the remnants of national control as matters
internal to the force and not affecting its overall command and control or international
personality. See SEYERSTED, supra, at 96-97. National contingent commanders may not seek
to confirm orders or take directions from their states of origin, Improving the Capacity of the
United Nations for Peace-Keeping: Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
at 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/48/403 (1994), but often have "liaison officers" in their command who
are authorized by the United Nations to maintain communications with their governments for
informational purposes only. A contingent commander or representative of a troop contributing state that objects to orders transmitted through the U.N. chain of command may not
countermand such orders but must raise the issue with an appropriate member of the U.N.
command, while representatives of his national government may raise the issue with the
Secretary-General or the Security Council. Id. This does not always happen. See infra notes
179-81 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Umesh Palwankar, Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to
United Nations Peace-Keeping Forces, 294 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 227, 232 (1993) (stating
that U.N. forces are bound by IHL) (quoting a letter dated Oct. 23, 1978 from the U.N.
Secretary-General to the President of the ICRC); Dr. Roy S. Lee, Remarks at the Conference
on the Law of International Organizations in Situations of Civil War (Jan. 30, 1994) (notes on
file with the author) (stating that U.N. forces are bound by IHL) [hereinafter Remarks of Dr.
Roy S. Lee (II)].
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govern permissible methods and means of warfare and the treatment of
sick and wounded combatants and civilians.4 There is U.N. practice that

The preponderance of legal opinion is in accord with the view that United Nations forces
are subject to at least some elements of IHL. See, e.g., Conditions of Application of Humanitarian Rules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in Which United Nations Forces May Be
Engaged, 1971 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE 465, 465-70 (Resolution I, adopted by the Institute at its 1971 Session); Dietrich Schindler, United Nations Forces
and International Humanitarian Law, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET 521, 526 (Cristophe
Swinarski ed., 1984); Oscar Schachter, Authorized Uses of Force by the United Nations and
Regional Organizations, in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER 65, 75
(Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds.' 1991); SEYERSTED, supra note 2, at 204-05;
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
206 (1953).
The first conflicts involving force authorized by the United Nations raised the issue of
whether or not the United Nations was legally bound by IHL, and at that time the answer was
less certain. See, e.g., Committee on Study of Legal Prob. of the U.N., Should the Laws of
War Apply to United Nations Enforcement Action?, 46 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 216, 220
(1952). An ASIL Committee concluded that,
[T]he purposes for which the laws of war [speaking also of the jus in bello] were
instituted are not entirely the same as the purposes of regulating the use of force by
the United Nations ....
[T]he United Nations should not feel bound by all the laws
of war, but should select such of the laws of war as may seem to fit its purposes[.]
Id., at 220.
4. For its part, the United Nations concedes to be bound only by the "principles and
spirit" of IHL. See infra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
The United Nations is not a party to any of the humanitarian law conventions and is
therefore not bound, as a treaty party, by their terms. However, to a large extent, the norms
expressed in humanitarian conventions are reflective of customary international law. See
generally United States v. von Leeb, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. io 495 (1950) ("The High
Command Case") [hereinafter High Command Case]; THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 45-78 (1989). This article will focus on those

customary law obligations involving the methods and means of warfare, as reflected in the
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, reprinted in 2
AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (Supp. 1908), and in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 44 (Adam
Roberts & Richard Guelff, eds., 1982) [hereinafter Hague Convention (IV)], and on the
customary law obligations protecting those fallen hors de combat and civilians, as set forth in
the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention (I)]; the Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (II)]; the Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention (Ill)1; and the Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention (IV)]
[The Geneva Conventions (I), (II), (III), and (IV) will hereinafter collectively be referred to as
the Geneva Conventions of 1949.].
In Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174,
179 (Apr. 11), the International Court of Justice concluded that the Organization was "a
subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties" (emphasis added), notwithstanding the fact that such rights and duties had evolved principally as the
practice of states. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES

§ 223 (1986) [hereinafter

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
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is consistent with this view,5 although the existence of such practice
should not be given undue weight in any analysis concerning the extent
5. There is practice that can be interpreted as consistent with legal obligation on the part
of the Organization. See SEYERSTED, supra note 2, at 182-96. For example, in the Congo,
both the ONUC forces and the Katangese rebels claimed IHL rights and alleged IHL violations by the other. See id. at 193. In the Congo, the International Committee of the Red Cross
was allowed to make visits to prisoners held by the United Nations and to brief United
Nations personnel on the requirements of the Geneva conventions; the ICRC issued reports in
which the United Nations was listed as the "Detaining Power." Id. at 196. The United Nations
also paid a "sommeforfaitaire" to the ICRC as compensation in connection with the death of
ICRC personnel in circumstances that pointed to the involvement of U.N. forces. See id. at
195. In addition, the United Nations entered into an agreement settling claims by Belgian
nationals against the United Nations for damage to persons and property arising out of U.N.
operations in the Congo. This agreement specifically reflects IHL in that it excludes claims
arising from military necessity. See Agreement Relating to the Settlement of Claims Filed
Against the United Nations in the Congo by Belgium Nationals, Feb. 20, 1965, U.N.-Beig.,
535 U.N.T.S. 199; see also Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Report of the
Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Agenda Item 61, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/7720
(1969) [hereinafter Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (1)].

There are statements by the Organization that may also be considered "practice" of the
Organization. See, e.g., Palwankar, supra note 3; Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee (II), supra note
3. However, while there are a number of instances in which the United Nations has indicated
that its forces "should" observe IHL or in which the U.N. has required that troop contributing
states agree to do so, such instances do not on their face clearly evidence an expression of
opinio juris on the part of the Organization; in none of these instances did there appear a
reference to the customary obligations of U.N. forces. See, e.g., Palwankar, supra note 3, at
232 (citing memoranda from the Secretariat to all commanders of U.N. forces, dated May 24,
1978, and from the Commander-in-Chief to all commanders at General Staff and contingent
levels, dated Oct. 30, 1978) ("[T]he principles and spirit of the rules of IHL should apply, as
laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocols of 1977 and elsewhere.") (emphasis added); Regulations Governing United Nations Force in the Congo, supra

note 2, 43 ("The Force shall observe the principles and spirit of the general international
Conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel."); Agreement Concerning the
Service with the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus of the National Contingent
Provided by the Government of Austria, Feb. 21-24, 1966, U.N.-Aus., 1 10-11, 557
U.N.T.S. 130, 136 (1966)
(I should also like to refer to article 40 of the Regulations concerning "Observation
of Conventions" which provides: 'The force shall observe the principles and spirit
of the general international Conventions applicable to the conduct of military
personnel.' . . . The international Conventions referred to in this Regulation include, inter alia, the Geneva (Red Cross) conventions of 12 August 1949[.]... In
this connexion, and particularly with respect to the humanitarian provisions of these
Conventions, it is requested that the Governments of the participating States ensure
that the members of their contingents serving with the Force be fully acquainted
with the obligations arising under these Conventions and that appropriate steps be
taken to ensure their enforcement);

Model Agreement, supra note 2, 28 ("[The United Nations peace-keeping operation] shall
observe and respect the principles and spirit of the general international conventions applicable to the conduct of military personnel.") (emphasis added).
However, more recently, the Organization has not been entering into agreements with
troop contributing states requiring that state contingents follow IHL rules. See Remarks of Dr.
Roy S. Lee (I), supra note 1. While a representative of the United Nations stated that the
practice of requiring the application of IHL rules by troop contingents has resumed, id., U.N.
armed forces were dispatched to Yugoslavia and Cambodia unaccompanied by any statement
or letter to the troop contributing states from the Secretary-General setting forth the IHL
obligations of the troops, see Palwankar, supra note 3, at 233.
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of U.N. IHL obligations because of the inherent unreliability of studies
purporting to detail humanitarian practice in armed conflict. 6 With
specific exceptions, IHL rules vest all entities that are parties to armed
conflict with the same obligations and thereby place them on the same
legal plane. 7 The implications for the United Nations of this "horizontal"
relationship between subjects of humanitarian law have engendered
continued resistance to the application of IHL to U.N. forces by those
who consider the United Nations to occupy, by logical necessity, a
superior as opposed to an equal position in all legal relationships related
to the Organization's mission to maintain or restore international peace
and security.' According to this view, a horizontal relationship between
the United Nations and another party to armed conflict is antithetical to
a world order organized pursuant to the principles expressed in the U.N.
Charter and supervised by the United Nations. Resistance to the applicability of IHL to U.N. forces has taken the form of claims to a unique
status for the United Nations with respect to IHL and novel constructions of IHL, both of which conflict with the very humanitarian rules by
which the Organization claims elsewhere to be bound. 9
With respect to those powers given to the Security Council in the
Charter, the United Nations, acting through the Security Council,
necessarily exercises regulatory powers over member states. This
vertical relationship based on the supremacy of Security Council actions
can. be analogized to relationships found in the European Community
and in national, federal systems. Where no vertical relationship or
supremacy exists, two entities, whether the United Nations and a state,
the EU and one of its member states, or the U.S. federal government
and a constituent state,, must interact with each other from a horizontal
position, namely, a position of equality.'" Humanitarian law rules

6. See Richard R. Baxter, Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International

Law, 41 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 275 (1965-66). Meron notes that customary IHL, unlike treaty
law, may not be denounced (except by the act of violation), and is not subject to reservation.
Theodor Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 348, 349

(1987).
7. IHL does recognize a vertical relationship between government and rebel forces
involved in civil war, pursuant to which rebel forces may be regulated by the state. See infra
notes 72, 107-17 and accompanying text.
8. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1 ("The Purposes of the United Nations are: 1. To maintain

international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the
prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace[.]").
9. See discussion infra part II.
10. See Siegfried Wiessner, Federalism: An Architecture for Freedom, 1 NEw EuR. L.
REV. 129, 132-33 (1993) (defining the vertical relationship of federal structure in terms of a
"composite of several state organizations and legal orders" and a "central state" that relate
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articulate minimum standards of conduct that can not be subordinated to
non-humanitarian Charter based norms."1 As a consequence, the

Organization must function in a manner that is consistent with both sets
of norms.
As an indication of their relative status among the hierarchy of legal
norms, those norms set forth in the U.N. Charter which dictate the basic
rules of the international order are considered peremptory norms of
international law.' 2 Membership in the United Nations, along with the
concomitant acceptance by members of Charter principles and the
Organization's Charter based functions, 3 has become symbolic of
membership in the international community.' 4 This is profound evidence
of the hierarchical position accorded the Charter as a source of law.

through "an allocation of powers, channels of mutual influencing of policies, and a certain
homogeneity of the orders of the component units and the central unit of political organization."); Eric Stein, Treaty-Based Federalism,A.D. 1979: A Gloss on Covey T. Oliver at the
Hague Academy, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 897 (1979) (discussing the functioning of the European
Community and the supremacy of Community law in those areas where the EC treaty implies
supremacy. The relationship between the EC and the individual states of which it is comprised is analogized to the vertical relationship that is characterized by "federal" states.)
11. See generally Ronald St. J.MacDonald, Fundamental Norms in Contemporary
International Law, 25 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 115 (1987); Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of
International Human Rights, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1986); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J.INT'L L. 413, 423-30 (1983).
12. Rules of international law from which there may be no derogation are described as
"peremptory" norms or "jus cogens." See OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 2, at 7-8
(Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992). They have been described as "[slitting
atop the hierarchy of international law[.]" Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d
1166, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 923 (1995) (Wald, J., dissenting),
reprintedin 33 I.L.M. 1483, 1497 (1994). While there exists no definitive list of peremptory
norms, those peremptory norms reflected in the Charter likely include the prohibition on the
unlawful use of force, see U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), respect for the sovereign equality of
states, see U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1), and the principle of self determination, see U.N. CHARTER
art. 1(2); see also Report of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of Its
Seventeenth Session and on Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev.l (1966), reprinted in [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 248, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1, U.N. Sales No. 67.V.2. Professor Henkin stated the inverse
proposition, that norms considered peremptory are often those that serve as quasi-constitutional rules of the international order. See Louis Henkin, General Course of Public International
Law, 216 R.C.A.D.I. 52 (1989).
13. Cf. U.N. CHARTER art. 4(1) ("Membership in the United Nations is open to all other
peace loving states which accept the obligationscontained in the present Charterand, in the
judgment of the Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.") (emphasis
added).
14. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS
195-207 (1990) (discussing the concept of "community" as defining rules and the coercive
power to conform to a rule created by the community, Franck argues that conformity is a
criterion by which a community regulates who will enjoy the community's benefits). According to Professor Franck's taxonomy of international rules, those rules that define the international community are among those that have the strongest pull to compliance and arguably
have the highest status among norms.
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the dignity of the human person has also evolved into a basic
organizing principle of the international order, of equal or similar stature
to peremptory Charter norms.' 5 Respect for the principle of humanity, as
manifested in IHL, has also become a condition of membership in the
international community,. 6 and many humanitarian law norms are
deemed to constitute peremptory norms of international law.' 7 These
norms have come to be regarded as having a status comparable to, if not
higher than, Charter based norms. 18 Humanitarian norms have been
.But

15. Both human rights and humanitarian law arise out of the respect for the human
dignity of the individual and reflect the need to protect the same, despite the historical
differences in origins of these two branches of law. See generally Jacques Meurant, HumanitarianLaw and Human Rights Law: Alike Yet Distinct,293 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 89 (1993);
Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite, International HumanitarianLaw and Human Rights
Law, 293 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 94 (1993); Oscar Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative

Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848 (1983).
16. See generally FRANCK, supra note 14, at 200-07. As many states are parties to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 as are members of the United Nations. As of December 31,
1993, 185 states are party to the Geneva Conventions, see States Party to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and to Their Additional Protocols, 298 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 68, 70 (1993), and 185 states are members of the United Nations, see Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December, 1994, at 3, U.N.
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/13, U.N. Sales No. E.95.V.8 (1995). See also G.A. Res. 2444, U.N.
GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1969) (humanitarian principles
should be observed by "all governmental and other authorities responsible for action in
armed conflicts" (emphasis added), which the Secretary-General interpreted as addressing
"every other authority which has the responsibility of conducting military operations in the
course of armed conflicts[.]" Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (I), supra note 5,
at 6 (emphasis added)); Andy Bowers, Europe Urges Russia to Negotiate With Chechnya
(NPR Morning Edition radio broadcast, Jan. 4, 1995) (demonstrating how the community of
states makes clear that the behavior of a state may place it outside of the bounds of the
community: "Yesterday, Germany, Sweden, and the Netherlands, all voiced concern about
what's going on in Chechnya. The Swedish foreign minister said, 'A civilized country does
not resolve conflicts in a manner that causes so much human suffering, death and destruction.' . . . [T]he German foreign minister, .Klaus Kinkel, voiced similar concerns[.]"), available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
17. See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 4, pmbl. 8, 2 AM. J.INT'L L. at 91-92,
DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR at 45 (Martens clause). For a discussion of the Martens

Clause as an element of customary international law, see infra note 92. The rules set forth in
common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were described by the International
Court of Justice as a "minimum yardstick" reflective of "elementary considerations of
humanity." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 218 (June 27) (quoting Corfu Channel Merits (U.K. v. AIb.), 1949 I.C.J. 22
(Apr. 9)), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986). With regard to the Geneva Conventions of
1949, Theodor Meron has noted their "humanitarian underpinnings and deep roots in tradition
and community values." See Meron, supra note 6, at 350. Moreover, the International Law
Commission concluded that limitations on the methods and means of warfare were also
peremptory norms. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Thirty-Second Session, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., Supp No. 10, at 97-98, U.N. Doc. A/35/10
(1980).
18. See, e.g., MacDonald, supra note 11, at 144 ("[lI]t is difficult to see why it [the
Charter] should prevail over rules jus cogens and erga omnes; they bind all states and are
non-derogable whereas the Charter is essentially concerned with the acts of Members.")
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characterized as "essential and inalienable human rights,"' 9 and focus on
protection of the individual as opposed to the group.2' They may not be
diminished by reference to an external standard or subordinated to the
essentially utilitarian mission of an international organization,2 and no
competing value can take precedence over them, whether or not that
competing value is grounded in the Charter. 22 Therefore, while an International Conference on Human Rights concluded that "peace is the
underlying condition for the full observance of human rights and war is
their negation,' 23 wholly unrestricted U.N. action as a means of achieving a state of peace can not be justified as effectively maximizing
human rights if inconsistent with the principles of humanity, where, as a
central organizing principle, the international community has established
in the IHL rules a fundamental minimum standard for the treatment of
human beings. Even if one were to go so far as to treat the U.N. Charter
in an expansive manner as the "constitution" of the international order,
the status to which this would elevate Charter norms would not per se
diminish the relative status of IHL norms.24
Ultimately, with respect to the terms of the Charter, there is no
conflict between IHL and the Charter norms related to international
peace and security. To the extent that the rules of the international
community expressed in the U.N. Charter vest the organs of the United
Nations with specific powers to supervise the international order, the
United Nations, -as a necessary correlative, occupies a superior legal
position with respect to those powers and a vertical relationship to the
subjects of its supervision.2 5 The Security Council, acting to maintain or
restore international peace and security, is expressly given the power to
make recommendations, to take decisions binding on states, and even to

19. S.C. Res. 237, U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess., 1361st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/237 (1967).
20. See supra note 15.
21. Professor Schachter notes that such rights "derive from the inherent dignity of the
human person[,]" as opposed to being derived from "the state or any other external authority."
Schachter, supra note 15, at 853.
22. See Oscar Schachter, The United Nations and Internal Conflict, in DISPUTE SETTLEMENT THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS 301, 305 (K. Venkata Raman ed., 1977) (listing
competing goals derivable from the Charter).
23. FINAL ACT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, at 18, U.N.
Doc. AICONF.32/41, U.N. Sales No. E/68.XIV.2 (1968) (Resolution XXIII: Human Rights in
Armed Conflicts).
24. Various Charter norms and norms derived from the principle of humanity are related.
For example, the right of democratic entitlement and the corollary concept of popular
sovereignty hold that the legitimacy of a government is derived from the consent of its
populace. See infra note 111. Thus, the legitimacy of state decision-making through international bodies such as the United Nations devolves to the consent of individuals.
25. See supra note 7.
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authorize the use of force against a state.26 In the context of armed
conflict, these powers serve to recognize or bestow the right or absence
of right to use force corresponding to the jus ad bellum. 7 In contrast,
while the United Nations may deploy its own armed forces pursuant to
the provisions of Chapter VI or VII, that action on the part of the
Organization does not itself imply a vertical relationship between U.N.
forces and opposing forces. Thus, while the existence of the United
Nations does provide a mechanism for assessing "right" and "wrong" with
respect to the original entitlement to the resort to force that is necessarily
vertical in its operation, one would have to engage in a further step of
logical analysis to conclude that the mere existence of the United Nations
creates an exception to the principles of humanity upon which IHL and
the division between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello are based.2"

26. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 36, 39 (Security Council has power to make recommendations), art. 25 (members agree to accept and carry out Security Council decisions), arts. 42, 48
(Security Council may take action by force, may authorize action by members); see generally
Michel Virally, Unilateral Acts of International Organizations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW:
ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS 241 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991).

27. At the birth of the United Nations there existed a clear division in international law
between the jus ad bellum or "law of war," governing the right of a state to resort to the force
of arms to settle conflict, and thejus in bello or "law in war," governing permissible prosecution
of the conflict and the treatment of civilians and fallen combatants. See generally Bernhardt
Graefrath, Introductionto the Law of Conflictual Relations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 26, at 709. The jus in bello licenses the attacks of one
military force on the other so long as the means of inflicting mayhem and destruction conform
to certain rules and so long as those licensed to commit acts of war, i.e., "combatants,"
reasonably attempt to shield civilians, the wounded, and the sick from attack. Prior to the full
evolution of this divide, the legal rights of those now protected by IHL depended, inter alia,
on the entitlement or "just cause" ,to engage in conflict of the sovereign power to which they
were subject. See, e.g., THEODOR MERON, HENRY'S WARS AND SHAKESPEARE'S LAWS 34 (1993)
(discussing Henry V's need to establish a justification for his invasion of France in order to
avoid responsibility for causing death) [hereinafter HENRY'S WARS]. "

28. The divide between the two bodies of law recognized four mutually supporting premises
that have an existence independent of the Charter: (i) the transcendent dignity of the individual
human person requiring a minimum quantum of protection, see supra notes 15-17 and
accompanying text, (ii) the inherent difficulty of determining objective right from wrong in war,
see, e.g., James F. Childress, Francis Lieber's Interpretation of the Laws of War: General
Orders No. 100 in the Context of His Life and Thought, 21 AM. J. JuIus. 34, 45-47 (1976)
(noting that the American Civil War Confederate General Jackson, for one, believed that no
Union prisoners of war should be taken because "the war was an offence against humanity so
monstrous that it outlawed those who shared its guilt beyond the pale of forbearance."), (iii) the
fact that those persons who bear the brunt of the suffering in armed conflict - field combatants
and civilians, as opposed to political leaders - have little control over the commencement,
conduct or termination of conflict, see Childress, supra, at 48; cf Zumwalt Seeks More Research
on Effects of Agent Orange (NPR Morning Edition radio broadcast, Sept. 17, 1994) (remarks
of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Vietnam War veteran) ("Military men, I think, recognize that they're
carrying out in war decisions made by' civilian masters and find it easy to understand the
professional actions of military men on the other side."), available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File; and (iv) the degree to which the realpolitik of warfare renders ineffective rules
of warfare that are prescribed unilaterally by one party for another. See infra notes 59-68 and
accompanying text.
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To reach such a conclusion, one must assume the subordination of IHL
norms to those expressed in the Charter.
Since the entity known as a "state" is a construct of law, armed
conflict between states is a conflict between legal regimes with incompatible sources of authority, substantive rules, and social orders.29 The
same is true where the United Nations (with or as a surrogate for the
international community) engages in armed conflict with a state or rebel
force. IHL represents the one set of universal principles which remain to
organize the conduct of conflictive parties. In that sense, the IHL paradigm
conceptualizes the rules of IHL as resting above the conflictive parties and
neutrally regulating their conflict as it occurs on a horizontal legal plane.
The United Nations can simultaneously exist (i) in a horizontal legal
relationship with conflictive states with respect to IHL orjus in bello rules
governing the operational conduct of a U.N. armed force, and (ii) in a
vertical relationship with conflictive states with respect to jus ad bellum
rules regulating the resort to force.30
The International Court of Justice addressed the issue of the U.N.'s
legal status, as manifested by the Organization's rights and responsibilities
in the Reparations case,3' involving the assassination of Count Bernadotte
while serving as an agent of the United Nations in Palestine. Although
Count Bernadotte's mission arose out of the Organization's authority to
regulate matters of international peace and security 32 - part and parcel
of its vertical relationship to other international actors - the United
Nations' right to claim reparations for the Count's death was deemed to
be governed by the same rules that horizontally bind all other members
of the international community. The Court stated that the Organization had
"the capacity to resort to the customary methods recognized by international law for the establishment, the presentation and the settlement of
claims. 33 No special status existed in this regard for the United Nations.34
Thus, perforce, the United Nations may enjoy simultaneously a different
legal status with respect to the exercise of each of its various functions.
The Reparations court's analysis linked the status and rights of subjects
29. See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
30. In a report on respect for human rights in armed conflict, the U.N. Secretary-General
discussed at length the degree to which humanitarian norms are consistent with the purposes
and principle of the United Nations. See Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (I), supra

note 5, at 10-15.
31. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174
(Apr. 11).

32. Count Bernadotte was appointed U.N. mediator to Palestine pursuant to a resolution
of the General Assembly. See PHILIP C. JEssup, THE BIRTH OF NATIONs 283 (1974).

33. 1949 I.C.J. at 177.
34. It should be noted that the case involved expansion of U.N. rights, not their limitation.
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of international law to the "needs of the community" and the "requirements of international life."35 To the extent that these needs and requirements are reflected in the broad reach of IHL to encompass all de facto
conflicts,36 such needs and requirements3 7argue against special status for
the United Nations with regard to IHL.
Consistent with IHL, that special status of the United Nations pertaining specifically to the maintenance of international peace and security
may be preserved, and attacks on U.N. forces prohibited (and criminalized
as a matter of individual responsibility) as violations of the jus ad bellum,
despite the fact that the United Nations may not outlaw the actions of
combatants taken against U.N. forces that are otherwise protected by the
combatant's privilege.38 Because all conflicts in which the United Nations
engages are international in character. and subject to the rules providing
for the combatant's privilege,39 only this approach is consistent with the
view that the Organization is bound by IHL.4 Outlawing attacks on U.N.

35. The Court stated:
[W]e must consider what characteristics it was intended thereby to give to the
Organization. The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical
in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs
of the community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has
been influenced by the requirementsof internationallife, and the progressive increase
in the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon
the international plane by certain entities which are not States.
1949 I.C.J. at 178 (emphasis added). Similarly, Professor Weil, speaking of the criteria by which
the international system establishes a normative hierarchy, observed that "it is recognition of
a rule's importance by the international community of states that is the touchstone as between
peremptory and ordinary rules[.]" Weil, supra note 11, at 425.
36. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
37. See G.A. Res. 2675, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1971) (The General Assembly noted that the international community has in the present century
"accepted an increased role and new responsibilities for the alleviation of human suffering in
any form and in particular during armed conflicts[.]"); see also supra notes 14-24.
38. See infra notes 100-57 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 100-57 and accompanying text.
40. The Institut de Droit International concluded that thejus in bello could not provide for
"discrimination" in favor of the United Nations, but that such discrimination might exist with
regard to the jus ad bellum. See Equality of Application of the Rules of the Law of War to
Partiesto anArmed Conflict, 1963 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT Du DROIT INTERNATIONALE 369,
376 (Resolution IV, adopted by the Institute at its 1963 session); Conditions of Application of
HumanitarianRules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United Nations Forces May Be
Engaged, supra note 3, pmbl. IN 4-5, at 465. Thus, any legislative power that the Security
Council might possess relating to the use of force pursuant to Chapters VI or VII would be
limited to the jus ad bellum. See supra note 27. This is true with regard to armed conflict
involving U.N. forces acting under Chapter VI or VII mandates. For example, the aide-mdmoire
outlining the directives given to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) states
principles of "self-defense" that include: "(a) attempts by force to compel them to withdraw from
a position which they occupy under orders from their commanders, . . . [and] (c) attempts by
force to prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders[.]"
Note by the Secretary-General: Aide-Mimoire Concerning Some Questions Relating to the

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 17:53

forces as contrary to the jus ad bellum is consistent with the Security
Council's approach in several situations 4' and the Allies' approach to
attacks by Germany's Nazi regime."' Such an approach limits individual
responsibility for attacks on U.N. forces to military commanders and
political leaders,43 except to the extent that rank and file soldiers could
otherwise be prosecuted for war crimes. 44
Derogations from IHL are not permitted,45 and any excuses for nonperformance of IHL obligations on the part of the Organization must be
consistent with the Organization's horizontal status under the IHL regime
and must rely on rules applicable to all conflictive parties. By contrast,
U.N. arguments for limiting its obligations under IHL devolve into
arguments for special rules and exceptions unavailable to other subjects
of IHL. For example, U.N. arguments of necessity can not constitute an
excuse for non-performance, because IHL specifically limits claims of6

non-military necessity and takes "military" necessity into account.4

Therefore, claims by the United Nations based on arguments of necessity
outside the scope of IHL would per se involve granting the United Nations
an elevated status and special rights.47 Excuses for non-performance must

Function and Operation of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, U.N. SCOR,
19th Sess., at. 4, U.N. Doc. S/5653 (1964).
.
41. This type of approach is compatible with the language in S.C. Res. 804, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3168th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/804 (1993) (Angola), and in S.C. Res. 792, U.N.
SCOR, 47th Sess., 3143d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/792 (1992) (Cambodia), which merely
condemned attacks on U.N. personnel without clearly conflicting with the combatant's privilege.
In contrast, S.C. Res. 837, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3229th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRes/837 (1993)
(Somalia), implied that the attacks on U.N. forces were illegal as a matter of the jus in bello.
42. See Lauterpacht, supra note 3; at 236.
43. Id.
44. See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg Forty Years After, 80 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y
INT'L L. 59 (1986); see also infra note 92. Sadly, regardless of the substantive legal approach
taken, any effort to criminalize attacks on U.N. armed forces will remain subject to the
limitations of victor's justice and the possibility that legal liability will be bargained away in
the terms of any peace settlement not based on unconditional surrender. See Marc D. Charney,
The Laws of War Are Many, but Self-Interest Is the Only Enforcer: Conversations/Telford
Taylor, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 25, 1994, § 4, at 7 (Former Nuremberg prosecutor contrasts Nazi
unconditional surrender with situation in the former Yugoslavia with reference to the total
control exercised by the victors in the former case). Mr. Taylor describes as the norm, specific
cases in which prosecutions for war crimes occurred but where no meaningful punishment was
ever inflicted on the wrongdoer.
45. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
46. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Second
Session, supra note 17, at 97-98. "Violations" of IHL are permitted to the extent that they
constitute permissible reprisals. Id.
47. Some sort of "inability" to perform IHL obligations as an excuse for non-performance
has been noted by the Secretary-General. See Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict:
Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Agenda Item 47, 191(b)(v), at 60,
U.N. Doc. A/8052 (1970) [hereinafter Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (II)].
However, it is difficult to conceive of an entity that is capable of engaging in international
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be available to any subject of IHL to avoid the de facto creation of a
special status for the U.N. Future changes to U.N. status with respect to
IHL are possible to the extent that non-peremptory humanitarian norms
are subject to change by the processes of international lawmaking. 8
Ultimately, claims of special status for the United Nations as a matter of
IHL carve out a greater sphere of action in which the Organization may
commit acts which the international community has decided are below a
minimum level of humane conduct. Such claims would leave to the
vagaries of U.N. politics the vindication of humanitarian concerns. To the
extent that IHL norms are considered fundamental, the U.N.'s approach
undermines the legitimacy of the Organization as an instrument for the
development of more humane international order based on law.
II.

ARGUMENTS BY WHICH THE UNITED NATIONS

PURPORTS TO AVOID THE BURDENS oF

IHL

There have been allegations of serious violations of IHL by U.N.
armed forces,49 and it is likely that other violations have occurred.

armed conflict yet incapable of observing basic humanitarian norms, and such a basis for
excusing performance can easily swallow the body of humanitarian rules. "Inability" can not
serve as a Trojan horse for lack of political will. The United Nations argues that it is incapable
of occupying territory, despite the fact that U.N. armed forces are in fact capable of placing
territory under their actual control, as occupation is traditionally defined in the Hague
Regulations, and are capable of effective control over territory to which the United Nations has
no sovereign title, as occupation is more commonly defined today. See EYAL BENVENISTI, THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3-4 (1993).
Because the concept of "inability" to perform establishes a defacto excuse for derogating
from IHL norms, the grounds for such a derogation must be construed narrowly. Cf. Symposium:
Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 7 HUM. RTS. Q. 1 (1985) (identifying legitimate objectives and principles of interpretation of Civil and Political Covenant derogation clauses).
48. See generally ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1971); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 8 (1974-75); KAROL WOLFKE, CUSTOM IN PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964); see also
infra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note I (allegations of murder, torture, rape and pillage). Customary IHL,
evidenced in the Martens Clause of the Hague Convention (IV), articles 46 and 47 of the
annexed regulations, and common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, prohibits rape,
pillage, and harm to civilians not collateral to action that is militarily necessary. See MERON,
supra note 4, at 45-47; Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under InternationalHumanitarian
Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 424, 425 (1993).
In addition, there have been reports of U.N. forces firing on civilians. The organization
African Rights alleges that on May 27, 1993, Belgian soldiers shot an unarmed man in the back.
AFRICAN RIGHTS, SOMALIA: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE UNITED NATIONS FORCES 19-20
(1993). African Rights alleges further that a United Nations humanitarian officer stated that the
Organization was not responsible for IHL violations and that the matter must be taken up with
the commander of the Belgian national contingent, who in turn is said to have refused to meet
with the victim's family. Id. Another report states that a United States helicopter gunship opened
fire on a Somali crowd killing at least two Somalis, after a sniper shot and killed a Pakistani
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Notwithstanding the fact that the United Nations concedes generally that

it is bound by IHL, it avoids responsibility in specific cases by way of
legal arguments, many of them recycled, which devolve into claims of
special status and special rules for the Organization. In discussions of the
Organization's customary legal obligations, U.N. arguments are often
framed in terms of objections to joining the various humanitarian conventions, despite the dubious relevancy of these objections to matters
concerning customary law. By focusing on the humanitarian conventions,
the Organization can make arguments that turn on a textual analysis that
is not necessarily applicable to its obligations under customary law. As
a general matter, the arguments made with reference to the humanitarian
conventions illustrate the organization's hostility toward IHL as a legal
limitation on its own powers. For example, beyond the question of
50
whether or not the United Nations has the capacity to occupy territory,
the United Nations asserts that it does not have the power to establish an
integrated penal system with investigatory, arrest, and detention capability, 51 notwithstanding the fact that the former-Yugoslav war crimes tribunal

soldier. See 2 Somalis Shot Dead by U.S. Copter Crew, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at A3. The
killing of civilians not collateral to action that is militarily necessary is prohibited by customary

IHL. See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 4, pmbl.

8, Annex, art. 46, 2 AM. J.

INT'L

L.

at 91, 113, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR at 45, 56; Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra

note 4,6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 3320-22,3318-20,75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34, 86-88, 136-38 (common
art. 3); MERON, supra note 4, at 36.
Colonel Ann Wright of the U.N.'s Justice Division in Somalia criticized U.N. forces for
failure to provide the legally required warning to civilians prior to commencing a military attack
in which civilians might be harmed. See Keith B. Richburg, U.N. Report Criticizes Military
Tactics of Somalia Peace Keepers, WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1993, at A22. Regarding the duty to
warn, see Maj. John Embry Parkerson, Jr., United States Compliance with HumanitarianLaw
Respecting Civilians During OperationJust Cause, 133 MIL. L. REV. 31, 47-50 (1991).
MSF also alleged that on June 17, 1993, U.N. forces conducted a military operation in
Mogadishu with rockets, artillery and machine gun fire that included an attack on the facilities
of the humanitarian organization Action Internationale Contre la Faim and Digfer Hospital,
killing one and wounding eight. MIDECINS SANS FRONTItRES, COMMUNICATION ON THE VIOLATIONS OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN SOMALIA DURING UNOSOM OPERATIONS, Annex 2 (1993)

(addressed to the U.N. Security Council, U.N. chief military commander in Somalia and
commanders of the national contingents); Donatella Lorch, U.N. Attack in Mogadishu Follows
Hours of Bombing by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1993, at Al. MSF acknowledged that Somali
irregulars were using a portion of the hospital for military purposes, as a position from which
to attack U.N. troops with small arms but alleged, inter alia, that U.N. forces failed to minimize
collateral damage to civilians, and used disproportionate force in the attack on the hospital.
Attacks on hospitals not being used for military purposes are strictly prohibited as a matter of
customary law, as codified in the Hague Convention (IV), supra note 4, Annex, arts. 25, 27,
2 AM. J. INT'L L. at 107-08, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR at 53; and in the Geneva

Convention (I), supra note 4, ch. III, 6 U.S.T. at 3128-30, 75 U.N.T.S. at 44-46. Even if the
position of the snipers rendered the hospital a legitimate target, the prohibition against the use
of disproportionate or excessive force embodied in the Martens Clause would still apply. See
MERON, supra note 4, at 36.
50. See supra note 47.
51. Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee (I), supra note 1.
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is vested with just such powers.52 U.N. officers assert that there is no
entity that can serve as protecting power for the United Nations,53 despite
the fact that the Secretary-General himself has suggested that the ICRC
could capably function in that role.' Moreover, this objection is legally
irrelevant as a matter of customary law and factually irrelevant as a matter
of conventional law given that the protecting power mechanism has been
used only four times in its history.55 Indeed, many of these arguments are
based on constricted interpretations of language inconsistent with the broad
interpretation properly given to norms based on the fundamental concept
of human dignity.56 To be consistent with the peremptory nature of many
humanitarian norms, failure to observe IHL cannot be based on budgetary
constraints,57 failure to provide adequate training to troops 58 or other failings of political will that IHL is intended specifically to address.
Five specific arguments advanced by the United Nations that limit its
IHL obligations will be discussed below. They are arguments that: (A) the
application of IHL to the United Nations will compromise the effectiveness of the Organization in its efforts to promote peace; (B) the Organization cannot be a "party to an armed conflict" and U.N. personnel can
not be "combatants"; (C) the United Nations is bound only to observe the
"principles and spirit" of IHL, although the Organization refuses to clarify

52. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (1993);
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuantto Paragraph2 of Security Council Resolution 808
(1993): Addendum, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704/Add.1 (1993).
53. Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee (I), supra note 1.
54. See Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (I), supra note 5, 221-25, at 68-69;
Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (11), supra note 47, 243, at 76.
55. M. Jean-Paul Fallet, Remarks at the Eleventh Annual Seminar on International
Humanitarian Law for Diplomats Accredited to the United Nations (Jan. 20, 1994) (notes on
file with the author).
56. Derogations from humanitarian norms are not permitted, see supra note 18, and like
human rights norms, humanitarian norms should be construed broadly. Cf. Symposium:
Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 47.
57. Dr. Lee asked rhetorically how a United Nations with already tight resources would
be able to provide for the food, clothing, hygiene, and other needs of POW's in its care.
Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee (I), supra note 1.
58. The United Nations argues that the various troop contingents that comprise its forces
all have different training and can not therefore be held to a common set of IHL rules. Id. At
the level of international obligation, virtually all potential troop contributing states are subject
to identical rules by virtue of their customary obligations and virtually all states are party to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949. See States Party to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
and to Their Additional Protocols, supra note 16, at 70 (185 states are party to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949). While the issue is more problematic at the operational level, the
Organization and the various contingents must conform their methods of operations to IHL, not
the other way around. It may require that states train standby troops for U.N. missions in
accordance with a common training manual. It may mean that states must finally enter into
Article 43 agreements with the United Nations. It may even mean that the United Nations must
cease recruiting peacekeeping forces in the form of troop contingents contributed by states.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 17:53

the meaning of that term; (D) the United Nations may apply the IHL
regime applicable to civil wars and thereby criminalize attacks on U.N.
forces, thus freeing itself from the obligation to respect the combatant's
privilege; and (E) the humanitarian obligations of troop contributing states
satisfy the United Nation's own obligations.
A. The Effectiveness of the United Nations,
and JHL as "MarginalLaw"
The concerns of those resisting application of IHL to the United
Nations are functional as well as legal. They fear that the United Nations
will come to be regarded as just another party to the armed conflict in
question and that it will lose the perceived neutrality that enables the
Organization to function as effectively as it does. The United Nations
correctly views its neutrality as a key factor in its ability to broker
solutions to conflicts or to deliver aid. This perceived neutrality is
compromised or vitiated when the United Nations is seen as "taking sides"
or becoming merely another party to an armed conflict.5 9 Nonetheless,
manipulating the de jure IHL status of the U.N. forces involved in an
armed conflict in order to simulate or mandate neutrality - for example,
by the outlawry of attacks on U.N. peacekeepers - is irrelevant to the
actual perception of neutrality on the battlefield or around the negotiating
table. Opposing parties base their treatment of U.N. personnel and
operations on the effect of U.N. military involvement on the political and
military situation, not the humanitarian law consequences of such involvement. 60
Laws that favor the United Nations over the party with which it is in
conflict will not be obeyed by that party. Therefore, the presence or
absence of such laws is irrelevant to the issue of U.N. effectiveness. The
concept of "legality" itself is limited to the legal system by which it is
defined. By definition, armed conflict represents the effort of one legal
system to dominate and supplant another, whether or not such conflict

59. The possibility of casualties also makes it more difficult to obtain and sustain

commitments of troops from states that might otherwise provide them.
60. Unfortunately, the very presence of U.N. forces will have some effect on the balance

of power or the momentum of an armed conflict, and will therefore necessarily pose a threat
to the aspirations of one of the conflictive parties; the'question is to what degree are those
aspirations threatened. One member of the U.N.'s peacekeeping staff stated that it is for this
reason that U.N. forces will "obviously" be attacked if inserted into civil war situations.
Elisabeth Lindenmayer, Remarks at the Eleventh Annual Seminar on International Humanitarian
Law for Diplomats Accredited to the United Nations (Jan. 20, 1994) (notes on file with the
author).
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involves the United Nations. 6' IHL has a unique status because it is
comprised of the maximal set of rules conflictive parties will adhere to
in any event, notwithstanding other law to the contrary. For this reason,
IHL has been termed "marginal law," 62 because it is the only law that
applies "when the great body of international law which regulates the
peacetime relations of states has been cast aside by the belligerent. '63 In
such legally primitive circumstances, any approach to IHL that attempts
unilaterally to limit the opposing party's military tactics is doomed to
64
failure.
For those involved in insurrection, the penalty of imprisonment or
death is no worse than the risk of imprisonment or death resulting from

61. See Lauterpacht, supra note 3. From a historical perspective, yesterday's victor is
today's status quo, and as Lauterpacht notes with regard to the United Nations, law, like history,
is written by the victor. According to Lauterpacht,
[a~ll law' and all legal doctrine presuppose the victory of right. Should, in any general
conflagration, physical force wholly alien to the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations and of international law as we know it emerge triumphant, a new
legal order (if it may be so termed) dictated by the victor will arise. Juridical thinking
can make no provision for that contingency. It is necessarily confined to the existing
legal order and to the consequences flowing from it.
Id. at 236 (footnote omitted). In another sense, in terms of the criteria of legitimacy set out by
Thomas Franck, warfare constitutes a state of affairs in which the most basic rules that define
community are in dispute. See generally, FRANCK, supra note 14. The only rules that remain
are those by which the "means of settlement," i.e., the armed conflict, will be conducted.
62. FRaTs KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS xi (1971). In Kalshoven's words, IHL
deals with "situations where the behaviour of the human species verges on the brink of what
could still be considered human[.]" Id. Similarly, Baxter refers to the law of war in this respect
as "last ditch" law. Baxter, supra note 2, at 93.
63. Baxter, supra note 2, at 93.
64. According to Bailey, the laws of war are constructed on the premise that "a belligerent
should not be put at a disadvantage because the enemy breaks the rules[.]" Childress, supra note
28, at 66 (quoting SIDNEY BAILEY, PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRAINTS IN WAR 54 (1972)).
Similarly, Lauterpacht asks:
What belligerent, unless he has already been defeated or unless, in desperate
resignation, he expects defeat, will tolerate, without resorting to immediate retaliation,
the conduct of an enemy who claims to dictate the rules of the context - selecting
those which suit him and rejecting others? ... It is not easy to visualize hostilities
in which the rules governing their conduct are determined by one side[.]
Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 242-43; see Respectfor Human Rights in Armed Conflict (I), supra
note 5, 202, at 63.
That the above is true can be empirically confirmed in the failure of states in their attempts
to outlaw insurrection. There are approximately 150 civil wars in the world today, Barbara
Crossette, What Is a Nation?, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1994, at A10, despite the fact that
international law allows the state to prohibit and punish rebellion. See Geneva Conventions of
1949, supra note 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 3220-22, 3318-20,.75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34, 86-88,
136-38 (common art. 3); Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (II), supra note 47, H
152, 162-67, 182-86; Waldemar A. Solf, Problems with the Application of Norms Governing
Interstate Armed Conflict to Non-International Armed Conflict, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
291, 291-93 (1983).
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armed conflict itself.65 Asking the rhetorical question why belligerents
respect or violate IHL, H.P Gasser of the ICRC took note of what he
the fear of reprisals and considerdescribed as "cost-benefit analysis"
ations of international politics.66 For the Bosnian Serbs, Mohammed Farah
Aidid, or General Cedras, the analysis is a pragmatic one, involving a
weighing of the costs and benefits of opposing U.N. action, by force or
otherwise, calculated in light of their own respective political and military
goals. 67 Such an analysis will consider the likelihood of U.N. military
action, embargo, or other sanction in retaliation, the extent of U.N.
military strength, the strength of U.N. political will, and the political will
of the individual interested states. The fact that the United Nations may
be deemed to express the international community's will is factored into
this equation to the extent that it affects the balance of possible outcomes.
It is for this reason that legal norms may be observed to a greater degree
by conflictive parties when such norms protect U.N. personnel.
U.N. acceptance of and compliance with the full international IHL
regime increases the likelihood of compliance with humanitarian norms
by both sides at a cost of nothing more than acceptance of the de facto
power relationships of the battlefield. On the other hand, U.N. failure to
accept and comply with existing humanitarian rules lessens the likelihood
that parties in conflict with the United Nations will themselves abide by
such rules, without yielding an offsetting reduction in hostility to the basic
U.N. mission. The author readily concedes that IHL, if respected, does
affect military tactics, but the question of whether to respect such rules
is of secondary concern in the context of de facto armed conflict with
U.N. military forces where obeying such rules is perceived as significantly
influencing the outcome of the conflict. Ultimately, outlawing attacks on
U.N. military forces or otherwise providing for a special de jure status on
-

65. That is precisely the reason that states enhance the disincentives to insurrection through
the use of torture or collective punishment, both prohibited by human rights and IHL.
66. Hans-Peter Gasser, Scrutiny, 9 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 345, 346 (1985); see also
Charney, supra note 44. That his comment acknowledged the de .facto role of reprisals is
particularly enlightening given the fact that the right of reprisal, as a legal matter, has been
severely limited. See George H. Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratication ofAdditional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 AM. J.INT'L L. 1, 15-17 (1991).
67. Cf. Serbs Break Accord, Block Relief Trucks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at A4;
Donatella Lorch, In an Edgy Mogadishu, Relief Efforts Are in Jeopardy, N.Y. TiMs, June 23,
1993, at A3 (reporting relief workers' concerns that the United Nations is unwittingly favoring
some Somali clans over others and thus upsetting the political balance); Michael R. Gordon,
Clinton, Praising "Success, " Says Goal Was Not to Capture Aidid, N.Y. TIMFs, June 18, 1993,
at A14 (describing Somali attack on peacekeepers when it was perceived that they were going
to take over radio station); Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Sending More Troops to Somalia, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 7, 1993, at Al, A 10 (noting that Somali peace conferences held to reconcile various
clans and factions were perceived by Aidid as threatening in that the process could create
alternative power centers).
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the part of U.N. forces as a matter of the jus in bello will be futile. Such
approaches are doomed to failure and could only be enforced after the fact
in the few cases where U.N. forces obtain some sort of unconditional
surrender.68
B. Whether the United Nations Can Be a "Party to an
Armed Conflict" and Whether Its Soldiers
May Constitute "Combatants"
The United Nations often argues that it need not take action otherwise
required by IHL, because it is not and can not be a "party to an armed
conflict, ' 69 nor can its troops be considered "combatants. ' 70 These
concepts are critical to the existing IHL paradigm because the concept of
"party to an armed conflict" performs a "gatekeeping" function, establishing to whom IHL applies and under what circumstances. The activities of
"parties to an armed conflict" are regulated by IHL; the activities of nonparties are not.7' Similarly, the distinction between "combatants" and
"noncombatants" defines, among other things, who may kill legally and

68. In the words of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, "[It is impossible to visualize the conduct of
hostilities in which one side would be bound by rules of warfare without benefiting from them
and the other side would benefit from rules of warfare without being bound by them."
Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 212; see also Charney, supra note 44.
69. See Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee (I), supra note 1.

70.. See id.; Palwankar, supra note 3, at 232 (Author, as a member of the ICRC staff, cites
U.N. representatives as saying that the U.N. does not believe that it can become a party to the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 because, inter alia, "these [U.N.] forces might appear as
'combatants.' ").
The concepts of "party to an armed conflict" and "combatant" are interrelated. In order
to qualify as a "combatant" under customary IHL, one must be a member of a de facto armed
force that is commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, having a fixed, distinctive
sign or emblem recognizable at a distance, carrying arms openly, and conducting its operations
in accordance with the laws and customs of war. See Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 43(1), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 23, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1410
(1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Geneva Convention (I), supra note 4, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3124,
75 U.N.T.S. at 40; Geneva Convention (II), supra note 4, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. at 3228, 75 U.N.T.S.
at 94; Geneva Convention (III), supra note 4, art. 4(3), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138;
Hague Convention (IV), supra note 4, Annex, art. 1, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. at 97, DOCUMENTS ON

THE LAWS OF WAR at 48; cf. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (1), supra note 5,
1 176, at 57 (discussing minimal criteria for "armed conflict"). These requirements are based
on the premise that humanitarian standards can only be promulgated and implemented through
a chain of command; by contrast, armed mobs do not obtain the advantages of the laws of war
and are subject to prosecution under municipal law. It is the United Nations that is responsible
for the chain of command involving U.N. forces. See supra note 2; infra notes 159-61 and
accompanying text.
The U.N. forces use the distinctive emblem of the United Nations, although it has been
reported that United Nations armed forces have, in specific instances, removed their identifying
markings to lessen the threat of attack. Two U.N. Vehicles Are Hit in Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 1993, at A14. By taking off their "fixed distinctive sign, recognizable at a distance," U.N.
forces lose the combatant's privilege that they might otherwise have had.
71. See supra notes 69-70.
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who may not be killed legally in the context of armed conflict: Under the
existing paradigm, "combatants" may kill other combatants and be killed

by them, yet must take care to spare "noncombatants" -

principally

civilians - to the greatest extent possible.72 IHL requires that each
individual fall into one category or the other. 73 U.N. refusal to apply these
concepts to its forces is tantamount to completely rejecting the applicability of IHL and makes no sense in the context of U.N. statements that it is
bound by IHL.
The term "party to an armed conflict" is deemed to encompass any
de facto authority exercising command and control over military forces.
Those responsible for the formulation and interpretation of IHL apparently
did not consider the concept of "party to" an armed conflict to be ambiguous where armed conflict was engaged in by states and by rebels.74 The

72. If an individual qualifies as a combatant, he can not be tried as a criminal, and if
captured, he is entitled to prisoner of war status. See M.H.F. Clarke et al., Combatant and
Prisoner of War Status, in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECTS OF THE 1977
GENEVA PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION 107, 108 (Michael A. Meyer ed.,

1989). If he does not qualify as a combatant, he can not be attacked but may be prosecuted
under the criminal law for engaging in attacks. Id. While civil insurrection may be punished
as a criminal offense, the IHL regime that applies to internal conflict does not apply to armed
.conflicts involving U.N. forces. See infra notes 100-57 and accompanying text.
The obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians - only the former can be
a legitimate target of violence - has been described as one of the "purposes" of IHL. Clarke
et al., supra, at 112. This obligation was one of three principles highlighted by the General
Assembly as applicable in all armed conflicts. See G.A. Res. 2444, supra note 16, at 50. The
obligation to distinguish between combatants and civilians is a peremptory norm of international
law. See infra note 92.
73. According to the British Manual of Military Law:
It is one of the purposes of the laws of war to ensure that an individual must
definitely choose to belong to one class or the other, and shall not be permitted to
enjoy the privileges of both; in particular, that an individual shall not be allowed to
kill or wound members of the army of the opposed nation and subsequently, if
captured or in danger of life, to pretend to be a peaceful citizen.
ch. 14, 117
([344 G 798 Supp.] 1936), quoted in Clarke et al., supra note 72, at 108. The principle of
distinction is customary law. See MERON, supra note 4, at 34. While the means and circumstances by and in which a combatant must distinguish him or herself have been subject to
modification as a matter of treaty in Protocol I, the essential requirement of distinction has
remained. See Protocol 1, supra note 70, arts. 44, 48, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23, 25, 16 I.L.M. at
1410-11, 1412.
74. The General Assembly called for the application of basic humanitarian principles in
"all armed conflicts," by "all governmental and otherauthoritiesresponsible for action in armed
conflicts[,]" not simply by states. G.A. Res. 2444, supra note 16, at 50 (emphasis added). The
U.N. Secretary-General stated that the phrase "all armed conflicts" in Resolution 2444 was
intended to avoid "certain traditional distinctions as between international wars, internal conflicts,
or conflicts which although internal in nature are characterized by a degree of direct or indirect
involvement of foreign Powers or foreign nationals." Respect for Human Rights in Armed
Conflict (I), supra note 5, 21, at 11.
To the extent that the issue of applicability of IHL to U.N. forces was considered, the
conclusions drawn have evolved with time. See supra note 3.
UNITED KINGDOM WAR OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW: AMENDMENT 12,
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term "armed conflict" encompasses all de facto conflicts,75 with the
purpose of extending protection to all those individuals who suffer as a
consequence of armed conflict.76 The existence of "armed conflict" is
deemed a question of fact.
The United Nations is bound by customary IHL obligations that have
arisen as the -practice of states.77 This is inconsistent with the view that

131, at 43.
75. See Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (I), supra note 47,
76. See INTERNATIONAL COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE IV GENEVA
CONVENTION OF 1949 20 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC GENEVA (IV) COMMENTARY].

By its general character, this paragraph deprives belligerents, in advance, of the
pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There is no
need for a formal declaration of war, or for recognition of the existence of a state
of war, as preliminaries to the application of the Convention. The occurrence of de
facto hostilities is sufficient.
•. .The substitution of [the term "armed conflict"] for the word "war" was
deliberate. It is possible to argue almost endlessly about the legal definition of "war".
The expression "armed conflict" makes such arguments less easy. Any difference

arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties
denies the existence of a state of war.
Id; see also Lauterpacht, supra note 3, at 221 n.3 (citing examples ofjudicial decisions in which

hostilities in Korea were held not to constitute "war" and in which the'existence of "war" was
determinant as to the outcome of the cases). Schindler suggests that even a "minor frontier
incident" is sufficient to constitute armed conflict. See Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types
of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 163 R.C.A.D.I. 125,
131 (1979).
All conflicts to which U.N. forces are party are per se "international" in character, see infra
notes 100-157 and accompanying text, although it should be noted that the concept of "armed
conflict" performs an identical function with respect to international conflicts and civil wars,
i.e., "armed conflicts not of an international character." See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra
note 4,6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 3220-22, 3318-20,75 U.N.T.S. at 32-;34, 86-88, 136-38 (common
art. 3). In the context of civil wars, there is a minimum intensity necessary to qualify as an
"armed conflict," but it is low, going down to but excluding "situations of internal disturbances
and tensions, such as riots, [and] isolated and sporadic acts of violence[.]" Protocol IIAdditional
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Dec. 12, 1977, art. 1(2), 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1443 (1977)
[hereinafter Protocol II]. The Protocol II exclusion just quoted is reflective of customary
international law, although Protocol II in its entirety sets a higher threshold. See Bart De
Schutter & Christine Van De Wyngaert, Coping With Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts: The
Borderline Between National and International Law, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 279, 285
(1983); cf. Solf, supra note 64, at 294; Schindler, supra, at 146-48 (discussing ICRC practice).
Schindler concludes that the threshold of violence constituting' armed conflict not of an
international character is breached when hostilities are of such an intensity that military forces,
as opposed to police forces, are deployed against the insurgents in question. Id. at 147. In this
*vein, the Secretary-General noted that "[t]he duration of the conflict, the number and leadership
of rebel groups, their installation or action in parts of the territory, the degree of insecurity, the
existence of victims, the means adopted by the lawful government to establish lawful order, all
have to be taken into account." Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (1), supra note
5, 176, at 57. He further noted that these criteria are not incorporated expressly into common
article three of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, were considered significant by the participants
at the 1949 Geneva Conference, but may not have been generally accepted in toto as determining the scope of article three. See Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (II), supra note
47, R 133-34, at 43-44.
77. See supra notes 4, 11-48 and accompanying text.
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the Organization cannot be a "party to" an armed conflict because it is not
a state. Who but "parties to" armed conflict should be limited in their
conduct? The assertion that the United Nations cannot be a party to armed
conflict undermines the determinacy of the concept achieved by the broad
definition of the term.78 The United Nations' claimed inability to become
a party to an armed conflict while at the same time conducting military
operations equipped with tanks, mortars and helicopter gunships against
organized military forces would seem, on the facts, so absurd and disingenuous as to not pass what Professor Franck has referred to as the
equivalent of a "laughter test. ' 79 The U.N. position reintroduces the
element of uncertainty and legal sophistry into the definition of "party to
an armed conflict" when the Organization purports to define the term in
a way unknown to anyone outside, and perhaps even inside, the Organization, with potentially far-reaching and dangerous implications.
Unfortunately, this is not a new argument by the United Nations. For
example, when states contributing troops to ONUC expressed concern that
they would become parties to an armed conflict in the Congo, the

78. See FRANCK, supra note 14, at 50-66 (discussing the importance of the attribute of
"determinacy" in the analysis of whether or not states will likely comply with international law
norms).

79. Id. at 55. According to Professor Thomas J.Farer, a consultant to the Secretary-General
charged with investigating the June 5, 1993 attack on UNOSOM 11troops by General Aidid,
the United Nations does not consider itself to be involved in an armed conflict in Somalia.
Thomas J.Farer, Remarks to the Center for International Studies (Nov. 24, 1993) (notes on file
with the author). The United Nations proffers this conclusion despite the fact that U.N. forces
have been involved in high intensity firefights against forces that are highly organized and
display knowledge of sophisticated military tactics. U.N. forces have been armed at various
times with AC-130 Gunships, Cobra helicopter gunships, M-48 tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and mortars; and they have been subjected to fire from mortars, rocket-propelled
grenades, and AK-47's. See, e.g., Michael R. Gordon & Thomas L. Friedman, Details of U.S.
Raid in Somalia: Success So Near, a Loss So Deep, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1993, at Al; U.N.
Fire May Have Wounded 34 Somalis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1993, at A5. U.N. spokespersons
refer to U.N. operations in military terms. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Work
of the Organization, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 1, 1 438, at 84, U.N. Doc. A/48/1
(1994) (discussing the "military actions" carried out by UNOSOM II forces and the care taken
to avoid "civilian casualties"); Anthony Goodman, Five U.N. Peacekeepers in Somalia Killed,
44 Wounded, REUTER LIBR. REP., June 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnews
File (In the words of U.N. personnel, "planned targets seem to have been hit," and "UNOSOM
has disrupted the militia's command and control capability and driven the militia from its
base."); Farer, supra (describing a June 12, 1993 attack by U.N. forces as a reprisal for an
earlier attack on U.N. forces.)
The United Nations claims that it is fighting "bandits" and "criminals," despite the fact
that Thomas Farer's report submitted to the U.N. Secretariat noted specifically the military
organization and discipline of the forces that carried out the June 5, 1993 attack on UNOSOM
II troops, referring to their "firing discipline," "careful planning," and "sophisticated use of
locations and camouflage." See Report Pursuantto Paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution
837 (1993) on the Investigation into the 5 June 1993 Attack on United Nations Forces in
Somalia Conducted on Behalf of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, at 4,
U.N. Doc. S/26351 (1993).
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Secretary General stated that the United Nations, inexplicably, could not
become a party to an armed conflict so long as it was engaged in defensive operations.80 Nonetheless, this history of counter-normative practice
by the United Nations does not qualify as a lawmaking act, to the extent
that elements of IHL are subject to the processes of positive lawmaking,8 '
because the notion that an attacking party alone is bound by IHL has been
soundly rejected, is at odds with the concept of reciprocity at the regime's
core,8 2 and is totally unworkable in the battlefield context where it is often
not clear who is attacking whom and in response to what.83 Moreover, the
implications of such a view are staggering when one considers that the
United Nations has defined its realm of action as constituting "self
defense" in situations where there exist "attempts by force to prevent
[U.N. forces] from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their
commanders... . Thus, by definition, all U.N. peacekeeping mandates
provide for "defensive" military operations not subject to the laws of war,
except for the possibility that any given operation is ultra vires its
mandate. Such a redefinition of the concept of "party to an armed
conflict" would destroy humanitarian law if generally articulated by
conflictive parties. Such obvious manifestations of organizational selfinterest breed a cynicism that corrodes the overall integrity of the IHL rule
system.

80. The Secretary General replied as follows:

If ...United Nations troops engaged in defensive action, when attacked while
holding positions occupied to prevent a civil war isk, this would not, in my opinion,
mean that they became a party to a conflict; while the possibility of becoming such
a party would be open, were troops to take the initiative in an armed attack on an

organized army group in the Congo.
Report of Secretary-Generalon Steps to Implement S.C. Res. S/4741 of 21 Feb. 1961, U.N.
SCOR, 16th Sess., Annex VII, U.N. Doc. S/4752 (1961) (message dated Feb. 24, 1961 from

the Secretary General to certain African States, concerning the need for troops and the function
of the Force), quoted in 3 HIGGINS, supra note 2, at 121-22.

81. See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
82. See Gasser, supra note 66; cf. Christopher Greenwood, Remarks at the Eleventh Annual
Seminar on International Humanitarian Law for Diplomats Accredited to the United Nations
(Jan. 19, 1994) (notes on file with the author) (noting the ICRC's position that, as a matter of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the obligations of any two parties to an armed conflict must

be the same vis ti vis each other).
83. See, e.g., David Crary, Bosnian Army Accuses U.N. Force of Firing First in DMZ Gun
Battle, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 26, 1994, at A4. The problem can devolve to an infinite regression

to determine who attacked whom first and who was simply counterattacking in defense.
84. Note by the Secretary-General:Aide-Mmoire Concerning Some Questions Relating

to the Functionand Operationof UNFICYP, supra note 40. Thus, were the Bosnian Serb forces
to attempt to retake heavy weapons previously turned over to U.N. forces, the United Nations'
view of the law would allow it to engage in heavy combat over possession of the weapons yet

not consider itself engaged in armed conflict. As a result of this view, neither the U.N. forces
nor the Bosnian Serb forces fighting each other would be protected by IHL.
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A United Nations entitled to conduct military operations outside the
existing paradigm of protection is a United Nations unhindered by legal
restraints and entitled to engage in actions that IHL prohibits. Fortunately,
the United Nations remains bound by the same customary IHL rules that
are binding on states, and Organization practice that is not in conformity
with these rules constitutes violations of them.
C. The "Principles and Spirit" of IHL?
The United Nations argues that its IHL obligations are limited to those
comprising the "principles" or the "principles and spirit" of IHL.85 As with
the concepts of "party to an armed conflict" and "combatant," the United
Nations argues that it must comply with a set of IHL obligations unique
to the Organization and unknown to anyone outside it. Professor FinnSeyersted describes the genesis of the "principles and spirit" assertion as
an attempt to distinguish between the more general principles of customary
IHL, to which the Organization is bound, and some of the more detailed
conventional provisions, which the Organization argued it would not be
legally or factually capable of performing were it to become a party to the
various humanitarian conventions. 6 While the concept of the "principles
and spirit" of IHL may have corresponded originally to a more complete
set of customary IHL norms, subsequently it appears to have contracted
in scope so as to limit the United Nations' IHL obligations to only a small
subset of customary obligations.8 7
The body of United Nations customary IHL obligations should be
extensive and should encompass the peremptory norms of IHL. The rules
regulating the method and means of warfare are considered peremptory
norms of customary law,88 and commentators have concluded that most
of the provisions of Geneva Conventions I, II, III, and many of the
provisions of Geneva Convention IV and Protocols I and II also have

85. See, e.g., Palwankar, supra note 3, at 232 (quoting a letter dated Oct. 23, 1978 from
the U.N. Secretary-General to the President of the ICRC, stating that "the principles of
humanitarian law ... must ... be applied" by U.N. forces) (emphasis added).
86. SEYERSTED, supra note 2, at 190. But see supra notes 49-58 and accompanying text.
87. See Palwankar, supra note 3, at 233 (U.N. statements regarding its IHL obligations have

been selective and have not made clear the applicability of, for example, those rules regulating
the methods and means of warfare.)
88. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Second

Session, supra note 17, at 97-98. With regard to their status as customary law, see e.g., High
Command Case, supra note 4, at 535-42; Arthur K. Kuhn, InternationalLaw and National
Legislation in the Trial of War Criminals: The Yamashita Case, 44 AM. J.INT'L L. 559 (1950).
But see BENVENISTI, supra note 47, at 96-106 (with regard to the law of occupation, the Hague

Convention (IV) had lost its normative force by the time the High Command and Tokyo trials
reached these conclusions).
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entered into the body of customary law. 9 The Organization is capable of
carrying out many, if not all, customary obligations.' °
The Organization has not yet been willing to define the content of the
term "principles and spirit." 91 Even assuming, arguendo, that the United
Nations is bound by a restricted set of obligations identifiable as the
"principles and spirit" of IHL, there is no principled basis consistent with
humanitarian imperatives on which the Organization can refuse to identify
the specific content of these obligations. 92 An unarticulated norm is no

89. See, e.g., MERON, supra note 4, at 41-74.
90. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
91. Cf. Palwankar, supra note 3, at 233; Remarks of Dr. Roy S. Lee (II), supra note 3.
92. While an exhaustive study of the term "principles and spirit" is beyond the scope of
this paper, there are a number of norms so fundamental to IHL that they should readily be
deemed binding on the United Nations. Those norms characterized as peremptory should readily
be considered to fall within the concept of the "principles and spirit" of IHL. Included within
this category are those rules regulating the methods and means of warfare. See Report of the
International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Second Session, supra note 17, at
94-98. In addition, those rules embodying the concepts upon which the existing paradigm of
IHL protection depends should be considered binding on the United Nations, for example, the
concepts of "combatant" and "party to an armed conflict." See supra notes 69-84 and
accompanying text. Also presumptively binding on the United Nations are those norms embodied
in the Martens Clause, which contains the following three elements:
(i) that the right of parties to choose the means and methods of warfare, i.e. the right
of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy, is not unlimited;
(ii) that a distinction must be made between persons participating in military
operations and those belonging to the civilian population to the effect that the latter
be spared as much as possible; and (iii) that it is prohibited to launch attacks against
the civilian population as such.
Walter Klin, Situationof Human Rights in OccupiedKuwait, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n on Human
Rights, 48th Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 12(b), at 11, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1992/26 (1992) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED KUWAIT]. The Martens clause has been characterized as
embodying the most fundamental elements of humanitarian protection. See Protectionof Civilian
Populations Against the Dangers of Indiscriminate Warfare, 56 INT'L REV. RED CRoSS 588
(1965). The Martens clause embodies the principle of distinction between civilians and persons
participating in military operations that is so central to the existing paradigm of humanitarian
protection, See supra note 72. The clause has been further described as peremptory in character,
see HUMAN RIGHTS IN OCCUPIED KUWAIT, supra, and has been identified by the U.N. General
Assembly as containing basic humanitarian principles to be applied by all governmental and
other authorities responsible for action in armed conflict, see G.A. Res. 2444, supra note 16.
The term "principles and spirit" of IHL would presumably include those norms expressed
in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, some of which overlap with the
obligations incorporated in the Martens Clause. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 includes the following:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds,
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without
any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth,
or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
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norm at all and can not provide a basis for analyzing conduct. 93 Such a

(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18, 3220-22, 3318-20, 75
U.N.T.S. at 32-34, 86-88, 136-38 (common art. 3); see also, ICRC GENEVA (IV) COMMENTARY, supra note 76, at 38-40. These Article 3 norms have been characterized by the International Court of Justice as "elementary considerations of humanity." Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 218(June 27), reprinted
in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986); see MERON, supra note 4, at 32-37.
The term "principles and spirit" should also provide for individual responsibility in
accordance with the violations of customary international law enumerated in the Nuremberg
Charter as being particularly heinous and thus worthy of mention. The following were listed
as crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Military Tribunal in its Charter:
WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations
shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or
ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder
of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity[.]
Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Oct. 6, 1945, art. 6(b), reprinted in 10 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL

LAW No. io, supra note 4, at XIII (1951). The "principles and spirit" of IHL should encompass
the prohibitions against the commission of what are defined as "grave breaches" of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949. A Commission of Experts characterized such grave breaches as "war
crimes," and "the general notion of war crimes as comprising any violation of the law of
international armed conflicts, sufficiently serious and committed with the requisite intent to be
regarded as a crime." Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex I, at 15, U.N. Doc.

S/25274 (1993). The "grave breaches" provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra
note 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 3250, 3420, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62, 116, 238, 388 (arts. 50, 51, 130,
and 147, respectively), only apply in the context of international armed conflict; however, armed
conflict involving the United Nations is by definition international. See infra notes 100-57 and
accompanying text. The grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 articulate
the following violations: willful killing; torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments; wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health; extensive
destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly; compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of
a hostile power; wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular
trial; unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian. See Geneva
Conventions of 1949, supra note 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 3250, 3420, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62, 116,
238, 388 (arts. 50, 51, 130, and 147, respectively).
Finally, the United Nations should certainly be deemed bound by customary IHL where
there is evidence of past practice on the part of the Organization. Where there has been past
adherence to customary IHL norms by the United Nations, the Organization should bear a heavy
burden of explaining why it is not obligated to comply or capable of complying.
93. In the context of Tom Franck's rule legitimacy analysis, a "rule" with no content at
all is a rule of total indeterminacy. As a consequence, Professor Franck's rule compliance model
would predict that such a rule would command little, if any, compliance. See FRANCK, supra
note 14, at 50-66.
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"4norm" cannot provide guidance to troops, protected persons, or monitoring entities. 94 It is for this specific reason that the Geneva Conventions of
194995 and their protocols96 expressly call for wide dissemination of IHL
rules, a position regularly echoed by the ICRC since 186997 and by the
U.N. Secretary-General. 98 Failure to adequately disseminate such norms
in advance of armed conflict increases the likelihood of violations and
emphasizes the humanitarian system's weakest link: post facto punishment. 99 The unwillingness of the Organization to agree on or articulate the
content of the term "principles and spirit" prevents the Organization from
being held accountable for its actions.
D. Why Attacks Against U.N. Peacekeepers Are Protected by
the Combatant's Privilege and May Not Be Criminalized
The United Nations avoids its humanitarian obligations in yet another
way when it intervenes in civil wars. When the United Nations engages
in armed conflict with rebel forces, it wrongly applies the special set of
rules that bind states involved in civil wars, instead of the rules that bind
parties to international armed conflict.l°° This approach ostensibly allows

94. See Jacques Meurant, Dissemination and Education, 9 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. 364
(1985).
95. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 3248, 3418, 3616,
75 U.N.T.S. at 62, 114, 236, 386 (arts. 47, 48, 127, and 144, respectively).
96. See Protocol I, supra note 70, art. 83, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 76, 16 1.L.M. at 1427; Protocol
II, supra note 76, art. 19, 16 I.L.M. at 1448.
97. See, e.g., International Comm. of the Red Cross, Report on the Protection of War
Victims, 296 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 391, 408 & n.5 (1993) ("The dissemination of knowledge
of international humanitarian law must begin in peacetime, for there is no chance of it being
applied unless it is known by those whose duty it is to comply and ensure compliance with it.");
cf. id. 411-12 ("Training for the armed forces").
98. See Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (1), supra note 5, 117, at 41 ("The
wide dissemination of and publicity for international instruments of a humanitarian character
and for the corresponding rules and regulations adopted at the national level would appear to
be a particularly significant measure to ensure their better application").
99. Cf. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statement at the
I.C.R.C. Conference for the Protection of War Victims (Geneva), reprinted in 296 INT'L REV.
RED CROSS 373 (1993) (existing IHL is not being fully implemented); Cpt. Ashley Roach (Ret.),
Remarks at the Eleventh Annual Seminar on International Humanitarian Law for Diplomats
Accredited to the United Nations (Jan. 19, 1994) (notes on file with the author) (existing IHL
is not being fully implemented) [hereinafter Remarks of Cpt. Ashley Roach]; Charney, supra
note 44. The Secretary-General has noted that the ultimate purpose of humanitarian law is to
prevent violations; the process of sanctioning violators is not an end unto itself. See Respect
for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (1), supra note 5, 1 203, at 63.
100. The principal difference between the international and civil war IHL regimes is that
with the former, each combatant is vested with the "combatant's privilege," i.e., each soldier
that falls within the definition of a combatant is entitled to kill or wound enemy combatants
without committing a crime. Should that soldier be captured, s/he is entitled to prisoner of war
(PW) status. In contrast, the civil war regime allows the state to criminalize insurrection, i.e.,
those taking up arms against the government of the state are not entitled to kill or wound
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the United Nations to treat as criminal attacks against its forces that would
otherwise be privileged as a matter of IHL.10 1 As a matter of law, the

government soldiers and are subject to criminal punishment, often the death penalty for treason
or murder, if they do so. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3116-18,
3220-22, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34, 86-88, 136-38 (common art. 3); Solf, supra note
64, at 291-94; Clarke et al., supra note 72, at 107-08, 117-18.
101. The application by the United Nations of the civil war IHL regime is evidenced in
a number of instances in which the United Nations has treated as illegal actions that would be
permitted under the international regime as falling within the combatant's privilege. For example,
the United Nations did not recognize captured members of General Aidid's forces as being
entitled to PW status. Cf. Les Aspin, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Statement at Department of
Defense Newsbriefing (Oct. 4, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Scripts File
(characterizing captured members of hostile Somali forces as "detainees"). The United Nations
also did not recognize as prisoners of war those members of its own forces in the hands of
General Aidid's forces. Id.; Les Aspin, U.S. Secretary of Defense, Interview with Bryant
Gumble, Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 8, 1993) (transcript on file with author)
(characterizing captured U.S. airman as "detainee").
In the report prepared by Tom Farer for the U.N. Secretariat on the June 5, 1993 attack
on UNOSOM II troops, he states that "[n]o act could by its very character more perfectly
exemplify an international crime than the use of force against United Nations soldiers to prevent
them from carrying out their responsibilities." Report Pursuantto Paragraph5 of Security
Council Resolution 837 (1993) on the Investigation into the 5 June 1993 Attack on U.N. Forces
in Somaliaon Behalf of the Secretary-General,Annex, supra note 79, 1 7, at 3. While the author
agrees that such an attack could constitute a crime as a matter of the jus ad bellum, Mr. Farer
makes clear that those guilty of criminal action would include "persons who organized, planned,
approved or executed the attack[,]" i.e., the soldiers in the field. Id.
Indirect application of the civil war regime is evidenced further by U.N. treatment as illegal
under Somali law, attacks by soldiers in the field who, pursuant to the orders of rebel
commanders, have attacked U.N. forces. See id. at 3 (applicability of Somali law to persons who
"executed the attacks"); id. at 4-7 (description of the attack). This application of Somali law
serves indirectly to apply the civil war regime because it allows the prescriptive authority of
the Somali state to define the relationship between U.N. forces and those forces with which the
United Nations is in combat; the net effect is to criminalize attacks against U.N. armed forces.
Similarly, status of forces agreements between the United Nations and host states, have, by their
terms, required host states to act to deter and prosecute all persons responsible for attacks on
U.N. forces. See, e.g., Report by the Secretary-Generalon the Organizationand Operation of
the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., Annex 1, 18,
U.N. Doc. S/5634 (1964) (providing, inter alia, that "[tihe Government [Cyprus] will ensure
the prosecution of persons subject to its criminal jurisdiction who are accused of acts in relation
to the Force or its members which, if committed in relation to the Cypriot army or its members,
would have rendered them liable to prosecution.") (emphasis added), reprinted in 4 HIGGINS,
supra note 2, at 212, 214-15 (981). That the United Nations seeks to stand in the shoes of the
host state with respect to immunity from attack in civil conflict is made express in the model
status of forces agreement as well, which states that "[t]he government shall ensure the
prosecution of persons subject to its criminal jurisdiction who are accused of acts in relation
to the United Nations peace-keeping operation or its members which, if committed in relation
to the forces of the Government, would have rendered such acts liable to prosecution."
Comprehensive Review of the Whole Questionof Peace-KeepingOperations in All Their Aspects,
Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations: Report of the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Agenda Item 76,
44-45, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (1990)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Comprehensive Review]. Moreover, as an outgrowth of the U.N.
General Assembly's review of peacekeeping in all its aspects, the General Assembly has adopted
an international convention concerning the status and safety of U.N. personnel, including
members of U.N. forces, that purports to create a new rule of international law that would
criminalize attacks on U.N. forces that are otherwise protected by IHL. See infra notes 143-58
and accompanying text.
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United Nations is always subject to the IHL regime applicable to international conflicts, which recognizes such attacks as privileged, even when
the United Nations intervenes in civil wars. The Organization may not
avoid this obligation by relying on the host state's municipal law
criminalizing acts of insurrection, because the host state lacks jurisdiction
to apply its law to attacks on U.N. forces deemed privileged by IHL.' 2
Neither can the Organization rely on new conventional law that purports
to criminalize attacks on U.N. forces or otherwise modify the combatant's
privilege as it applies to the United Nations, where such conventional law
does not evidence a change in the customary IHL regime by which the
United Nations is bound. In theory, customary IHL could be changed to
either (i) modify the jurisdictional reach of IHL to allow a state to apply
its municipal law to criminalize attacks on U.N. forces intervening in civil
wars, or (ii) modify the substantive IHL provisions defining the combatant's privilege to exclude from the privilege the right to attack U.N. forces
intervening in civil wars. A convention that does not evidence a change
in customary IHL can not achieve these effects as a matter of treaty law
between its parties because all states, not just the convention parties, are
beneficiaries of customary IHL obligations owed erga omnes as a matter
of customary law. 103 While the recently adopted Convention on the Safety
of United Nations and Associated Personnello4 purports to modify international law by criminalizing certain attacks now falling within the
combatant's privilege, it does not achieve either of the foregoing objectives. Thus, as a matter of existing IHL rules, U.N. armed forces engaged
in armed conflict must, among other things, recognize a combatant's
privilege and right to prisoner of war status vested in their opponents in
the field.'0 5

102. See infra notes 107-31 and accompanying text. Prescriptive jurisdiction has been
allocated by treaty between states, cf. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts
Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 (anti-air
piracy); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (anti-air piracy), but these examples involve the trading
of jurisdiction possessed by the treaty parties. They do not involve the transfer or extinguishing
of the jurisdictional rights of states not party to the convention in question. Such an analysis
is appropriate in the case of the United Nations and a host state which, as was discussed, operate
on the same horizontal plane with respect to considerations of IHL. See supra notes 25-48 and
accompanying text.
103. See infra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
.104. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1994, 34 I.L.M. 484.
105. Whereas commentators have noted that civil war IHL norms do not provide for
individual criminal responsibility in cases involving grave breaches of those norms, individual
criminal responsibility for grave breaches is found in the international regime. It is the international regime that applies to conflicts involving U.N. forces and insurgents, thereby offering
some protection to U.N. forces in that regard. See Bassiouni, supra note 44; supra note 92.
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In the discussion that follows, it is important to recall that in a
multiparty conflict, each of the individual component bilateral "armed
conflicts" must be characterized either as "international" or not.' 6 Thus,
it is necessary to identify the bilateral conflict in question before characterizing it.
A principal function of international law is the regulation of extraterritorial assertions of jurisdictional authority by states 10 7 and the correlative prevention of conflicts between states. 0 8 As a general matter, the
state exerts exclusive and absolute power within its boundaries'0 9 and may
express that power and authority through acts of prescription defining the
relationships between private persons and between private and public
persons within the state, which comprise the state's political and social

106. In the Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice stated that for the purposes of IHL, an otherwise
multi-party conflict could differ in character in terms of being international or not with respect
to the component conflicts between any two parties. See Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 219 (June 27), reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 1023 (1986) (characterizing the conflict between Contra and Nicaraguan government
forces as not of an international character, while characterizing the conflict between United
States and Nicaraguan government forces as international in character); see also Dietrich
Schindler, International Humanitarian Law and Internationalized Internal Armed Conflicts, 230
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 255, 256-61 (1982) (discussing characterization as international or
internal the various component conflicts that comprised the Vietnam and Afghanistan conflicts.)
But see Interim Report of the Committee of Experts, Letter Dated 9 February 1993 From the
Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
Annex I, in 44-45, at 14, U.N. Doc. S/25274 (1993) (The report does not treat component
conflicts as distinct; rather, it concludes that
the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concerned, combined with the
web of agreements on humanitarian issues the parties have concluded among
themselves, justify an approach whereby it applies the law applicable in international
armed conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia.
However, this is a non-traditional approach.).
107. See generally Frank Visher, General Course on Private International Law, 232
R.C.A.D.I. 13, 201 (1992); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law
Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1957); Andrew L. Strauss,
Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction
in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373 (1995) (discussing inter alia, state sovereignty
as the incorporeal manifestation of jurisdictional prerogative and the role of international law
in regulating conflicts between sovereigns).
108. See Hedley Bull, The Continuing Validity of the Rule of Non-Intervention, in
INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 181, 184 (Hedley Bull ed., 1984).

109. But see Strauss, supra note 107, at 393 n.71.
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order."I0 The international community recognizes these prescriptions and

characterizes them as acts taken within the state's realm of sovereignty,
its domaine riservias a matter of international law."' Thus, international
law prohibits one state from interfering in the internal affairs of another
state," 2 including the social and political order of that other state - a
proscription that applies to the United Nations and its armed forces." 3
110. A state's jurisdiction to prescribe constitutes the state's jurisdiction "to make its law
applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons . . . whether by legislation, by
executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by determination of a court."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 401 (defining jurisdiction to prescribe, adjudicate, and

enforce); see generally, Benedetto Conforti, The Principle of Non-Intervention, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra note 26, at 467.
111. This paper concerns itself with the prescriptive acts of a state with effects wholly
within the territory of that state. The right to determine the political order within a state has been
interpreted by the U.N. General Assembly as falling essentially within the domestic jurisdiction
of that state. See Declarationon the Inadmissibilityof Interference into InternalAffairs of States
and on the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR,
20th Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 11-12, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); cf. Declarationon the Granting
ofIndependence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess.,
Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961) ("All peoples have the right to self determination:
by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development").
Substantive choices as to the political order within a state are to be distinguished from the
process by which such choices are made. The process by which a political order is constituted
must conform to the emerging democratic entitlement, a right which is held by the citizens of
a state with respect to the government of that state. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right
to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J.INT'L L. 46-47 (1992); Gregory H.Fox, The Right To
PoliticalParticipationin International Law, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992).
International human rights and humanitarian law stand as further exceptions to the rule
that a state may order the relations between citizens and the relations between government and
its citizens as it sees fit. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, pt. VII, introductory note;
Strauss, supra note 107, at 393 n.71; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 218-19 (June 27), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023
(1986).
112. See Bull, supra note 108.
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(1) provides that "[t]he Organization is based on the principle
of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Thus, as an organization comprised of states, the
United Nations may not interfere in another state's domestic realm. Moreover, the Charter
expressly limits interference by the Organization "in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state[,]" while acknowledging that such a limitation "shall not
prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
For example, with regard to UNEF I, the Secretary-General noted the following:
A rule closely related to the one last mentioned, and reflecting a basic Charter
principle, precludes the employment of United Nations elements in situations of an
essentially internal nature. As a matter of course, the United Nations personnel cannot
be permitted in any sense to be a party to internal conflicts. Their role must be
limited to external aspects of the political situation as, for example, infiltration or
other activities affecting international boundaries.
Summary Study of the Experience Derivedfrom the Establishmentand Operation of the Force:
Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 13th Sess., Agenda Item 65(c), Annex, 166,
U.N. Doc. A/3943 (1958).
The mandate of the U.N. force in the Congo also reflected the obligation not to interfere
in the internal affairs of states, although this obligation turned out to be difficult to respect in
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practice in the context of a disintegrating Congo. See generally 3 HIGGINS, supra note 2, at
14-60; Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Law in Africa: The Congo Operation as a Case
Study, 27 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 632 (1962). Speaking of ONUC, the Secretary-General noted:
"United Nations units must not become parties in internal conflicts, [and] they can not be used
to enforce any specific political solution of pending problems or to influence the political
balance decisive to such a solution." First Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Implementation of Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp. for
July-Sept. 1960, 13, U.N. Doc. S/4389 (1960). This position was "reaffirmed ' in resolution
S/4426. See S.C. Res. S/4426, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp. for July-Sept. 1960, 1 4, U.N.
Doc. S/4426 (1960). Secretary-General Hammarskjold further characterized such interference
as "shift[ing] the weights between personalities or groups or schools of thought in a way which
would prejudge the solution of the internal political problem." See Second Report of the
Secretary-Generalon the Implementation of Security Council Resolution S14387 of 14 July 1960
and S14405 of 22 July 1960, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp. for July-Sept. 1960, 1 10, U.N. Doc.
S/4417 (1960).
Higgins notes that the obligation not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo
remained a hurdle for the various U.N. organs because ONUC never took the form of an
enforcement measure under Charter articles 41 or 42. See 3 HIGGINS, supra note 2, at 54-60
(reviews the arguments for and against this conclusion). ONUC's mandate, inter alia,to "restore
law and order," S.C. Res. S/4405, U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., Supp. for July-Sept. 1960, at 34,
U.N. Doc. S/4405 (1960) (interpreted as a de facto mandate), and to use "all appropriate
measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo," S.C. Res. S/4741, U.N. SCOR,
16th Sess., Supp. for Jan.-Mar. 1961, at 147, U.N. Doc. S/4741 (1961), as well as the positions
taken by the United Nations condemning Katanga's secession and recognizing the Government
of the Republic of the Congo, see S.C. Res. S/5002, U.N. SCOR, 16th Sess., Supp. for
Oct.-Dec. 1961, at 148, U.N. Doc. S/5002 (1961), appear to have conflicted with the obligation
not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo. However, the ONUC mandate was, in theory,
reconciled with the non-interference principle on the grounds that ONUC action was directed
only toward the remediation of threats to international peace and security. Speaking of the
"mandate" to assist the government of the Congo with the maintenance of law and order, the
Secretary-General stated:
The legal justification for the Council decision was the threat to peace and security
which arose as a result of the intervention of Belgian troops in the Congo; this
intervention, in turn, occurred purportedly because of the widespread internal
disorders in the country. Consequently, to bring about the withdrawal of the Belgian
troops, it was considered necessary, in response to the request of the Government of
the Republic of the Congo, to introduce United Nations troops to assist the restoration
of internal order and security.
U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 913th mtg. 25, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.913 (1960). In another sense,
to the extent the secession of Katanga threatened the territorial integrity of the Congo, and
derivatively, international peace and security, the Security Council was empowered to condemn
the secession. While condemnation of secession might otherwise have constituted interference
in the civil conflict, the impact on international peace and security renders the U.N. action not
"essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" of the Congo. Nonetheless, Hammarskjold
recognized that peaceful interposition of troops alone inevitably would be perceived as favoring
one or the other side in the civil conflict, see U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., pt. 1, 957th mtg. 17,
U.N. Doc. A/PV.957 (1961), and that the use of force by the United Nations would, de facto,
favor one side over the other, see Second Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Implementation
of Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960 and S14405 of 22 July 1960, supra, 10.
UNOSOM II, by contrast, operated as a Chapter VII "enforcement" action, and thus was
not subject to the limitations of Article 2(7). See S.C. Res. 814, supra note 2. Nonetheless, some
commentators suggest that the Security Council's ability to invoke the enforcement powers of
Chapter VII and to free the United Nations fully from the rule of non-interference is itself
subject to legal limits. See, e.g., J.S. Watson, Autointerpretation, Competence, and the
Continuing Validity of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter,71 AM. J. INT'L L. 60 (1977); Thomas
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"International armed conflict" is that armed conflict in which the
extraterritorial effects of state action reach a threshold point where they
threaten the international order. 14 Conflict is often said to be "interna-

tional" when two "subjects of international law" are in conflict," 5 but this
analysis is merely a shorthand way of describing the general class of
situations in which one state is necessarily disturbing the international
order by asserting its own authority, in the form of armed force, within
the sovereign realm of another state, whether rightfully or wrongfully, and
without the consent of the "host" state. 116 On the other hand, "pure" civil

M. Franck, The "Powers of Appreciation": Who Is the Ultimate Guardian of U.N. Legality?,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 519 (1992).
In a recent report of the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peace-Keeping
Operations, the Committee emphasized that "respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of States and non-intervention in matters that are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State is crucial to common efforts, including peacekeeping operations, to promote international peace and security." Report of the Special
Committee on Peace-KeepingOperations,U.N. GAOR, 49th Ses., Agenda Item 1, Annex, 1 44,
U.N. Doc. A/49/136 (1994). The Committee noted further the "importance of... the need for
United Nations operations to continue to fulfil their mandates impartially." Id. 1 49.
114. See Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 154 (2d ed. 1979) ("Prohibitions of
intervention and interference, it should be clear, are part of the quest for an ideal of equally
sovereign and independent nations ....
Some act of any nation may reverberate everywhere.
Big powers, in particular, affect domestic affairs in other nations by their mere existence.");
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 53-56, 58-59 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952);
COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF
THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 39-50 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952)

[hereinafter ICRC 'GENEVA (1) COMMENTARY]; cf. supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 106, at 258; cf. W. Michael Reisman & James Silk,
Which Law Applies to the Afghan Conflict?, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 466 (1988) (mentioning
the applicability of Geneva and Hague law to conflicts between an established government and
a state intervening on behalf of the opposition, as well as to conflicts between states intervening
on opposing sides in a civil war); Hans-Peter Gasser, InternationalizedNon-InternationalArmed
Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 145, 147
(1983) (discussing the same point); OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 12, § 56,
at 203 (discussing "war" in the sense of international conflict as a contention between states).
116. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. The exception is the case of intervention by invitation of the host state. The traditional view of "state" or "absolutist" sovereignty
views the sovereignty of the state as vested in the de facto government of the state. See Fox,
supra note 111, at 550. The de facto government of a "host" state is thus entitled to invite a
third state to lend assistance in the form of armed force to suppress rebellion by citizens of the
host state without violating the sovereignty of or interfering in the internal affairs of the host
state. See Richard A. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in the Vietnam War,
75 YALE L.J. 1122, 1127 (1965-66) ("Traditional international law permits military assistance
to the incumbent regime during early stages of an internal challenge."). Pursuant to the state
sovereignty approach, there is no violation of sovereignty or interference in the internal affairs
of the state so long as the third state forces continue to operate within the scope of the host
state's consent. See HENKIN, supra note 114, at 306-07 ("[S]uch external intervention is not
obviously a violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter as a use of force against the political
independence or territorial integrity of another state, if the support was bona fide and the
intervenor was not seeking to dominate the side it supported and establish a puppet regime.");
Schindler, supra note 106 (discussing forcible installation of a new government through the
intervention of a foreign State); cf. Reisman & Silk, supra note 115 (discussing the de facto
takeover of the Afghan government).
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war, that is, civil war without cross-border effects that threaten the international order, is treated by the international community as essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the state.' 1 7 In the context of civil wars,
the international community recognizes the state's jurisdiction to prescribe
rules that define the relationship between the state and its rebellious
citizens, including rules that define their rebellion as criminal.118 At the
threshold of international armed conflict, the international community
ceases to defer to the individual state's legal characterization of the
rebellion; instead, the international community asserts its own rules and
interests in regulating conflictive conduct.
By definition, the boundaries of the jus ad bellum manifest the
jurisdictional boundaries between civil war and international conflict between the conflicts limited to the sovereign realm of the state and the
conflicts that so disturb the international order that they fall within the
jurisdiction of international law." 9 Jus ad bellum rules have evolved
specifically to address those circumstances where the international
community has decided that its interests are at stake, whether those rules
deem the conduct of a particular party to an armed conflict to be lawful
or unlawful.1 20 IHL, in turn, incorporates the characterization of conflict
as international or internal as reflected in the jus ad bellum.'2 Moreover,

An alternative concept of sovereignty denoted "popular sovereignty," expresses the view
that a government's legitimacy is derived from its people. See Fox, supra note 111 (discussing
the traditional and popular models of state sovereignty in the context of reviewing the process
by which the U.N. credentials its delegates). Popular sovereignty is a conceptual limitation on
the right of a government to act for the state and to authorize the use of a foreign state's armed
force against the government's own citizens.
117. See supra notes 106-11. In fact, the definition of civil conflict found in Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 defines civil war in terms of what it is not, i.e., "armed conflict
not of an international character." See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 4, 6 U.S.T. at
3116-18, 3220-22, 3318-20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32-34, 86-88, 136-38 (common art. 3); ICRC
GENEVA (I) COMMENTARY, supra note 114, at 39-50.
118. See supra notes 64, 72, 107-111.
119. See supra notes 27-28. The author defines the term broadly to encompass that body
of law by which the use or threat of armed force by one state against another is either prohibited
or deemed justified. This would include articles 2(4) and 51 of the U.N. Charter, as well as the
various doctrines of intervention. See generally Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use
Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984); Ronald St. J. MacDonald, The Use of Force by
States in InternationalLaw, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS, supra
note 26, at 717; INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 108.

120. For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to determine precisely where the
line between civil and international conflict lies. Indeed, the precise definition of the demarcation
between the two is not certain and subject to continuing evolution and debate. See Nationality
Decrees Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 4 (Feb. 7). It is sufficient for the purposes
of this article to demonstrate that with regard to armed conflict between U.N. forces on one hand
and either government or rebel forces on the other, the rules governing such conflict are those
mandated by international law and not by a state rule.
121. See, e.g., Schindler, supra note 106, at 256-61. Whether the international or civil war
IHL regime applies to a given conflict is a consequence of the characterization of a conflict as
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because of the status enjoyed by the principle of humanity in the normative hierarchy of international law, 22 the applicability of IHL rules
must
23
be construed at least as broadly as that of jus ad bellum rules.
When the United Nations intervenes in a civil war, it is the jus ad
bellum that prescribes and delimits the right of the Organization to engage
in armed conflict with rebel forces, whether that armed conflict is
offensive or defensive in nature. 24 Thus, the lawfulness of U.N. armed
conflict is defined with reference to mandatory rules of international law,
which include the resolutions of the Security Council itself, not permissive
rules that allow the host state to define, in its own discretion and by way
of its own municipal law, the scope of U.N. conduct. 25 On one level, this
must be true because the United Nations is constituted as a matter of
international law 126 and Charter and Charter-based processes. 12 Thus, U.N.

international or internal. See id. That this is true is evident further in the fact that IHL applies
the more restrictive regime to civil wars, despite the conclusion of many commentators that the
objective cruelty present in civil war is greater than that present in international conflict and
should require at least a similarly detailed set of rules. See, e.g., ICRC GENEVA (IV) COMMENTARY, art. 3, supra note 76, at 27; Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (I), supra note
5, 9. However, the internal IHL regime does take into account the more limited capacity of
rebel forces to observe the laws and customs of war. See G.I.A.D. Draper, HumanitarianLaw

and Internal Armed Conflicts, 13 GA. J.

INT'L

& COMP. L. 253, 268-70 (1983).

While the internationalIHL regime applies in the same circumstances that jus ad bellum

rules apply, the internal IHL represents a further intrusion into the domestic realm. See supra
note 76. With regard to the minimum protection required by the civil war IHL regime, no armed
conflict can truly be considered to fall solely within the domaine riservd as a matter of IHL.
122. See supra notes 11-48 and accompanying text.
123. Cf. Symposium: Limitation and DerogationProvisions in the InternationalCovenant
on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 47, at 1.
124. See supra note 113 (discussing the international law grounds for U.N. intervention
in civil conflict); Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in InternalConflicts: Iraq, Somalia,
and Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519 (1994); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Continuing Limits on
UN Intervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903 (1992); Paul C. Szasz, Role of the United
Nations in Internal Conflicts, 13 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 345 (1983).
125. The rules are "mandatory" in the sense that international law provides that intervention
is or is not permitted. See supra note 113.
126. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 221 cmt. a ("[A]n international organization is an inter-state organization, established by an international agreement governed by
international law.")
127. However, the possibility exists of U.N. action ultra vires the Charter or U.N. action
otherwise in violation of international law. See Watson, supra note 113; Franck, The "Powers
of Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardianof U.N. Legality?, supra note 113. Ultimately,
the degree to which the international order is perturbed by an otherwise civil conflict is a
function of the specific extra-territorial effects that a conflict engenders. See, e.g., supra note
124. However, in the case of illegal or ultra vires intervention by the United Nations, the
analysis requiring application of the IHL regime would remain the same because the prohibition
against U.N. intervention would itself exist as a matter of international law.
The United Nations can not intervene by invitation in a civil war and, as a consequence
of the invitation, apply the civil war IHL regime and treat as criminal attacks against its own
forces by rebels. In contrast, a third state can intervene by invitation and the civil war regime
will apply to the conflict between the third state and rebels. The difference lies in the fact that
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conflicts with rebel forces are "international" in character, despite the fact
that the "two subjects of international law" test might suggest otherwise
where a particular rebel movement is deemed not to be a subject of
international law. 28 Even where a U.N. armed force engages in armed
conflict ultra vires its Chapter VI or VII mandate, the conflict between
the United Nations and a rebel force is international and the IHL regime
governs the conflict. Fundamentally, the "international" character of the
United Nations-insurgent relationship is defined with reference to the
source of law authorizing U.N; action and defining the jus ad bellum
rights of the conflictive parties, not the legality of the action and not the
character of any particular de facto government involved. Therefore, the
presence or absence - in Somalia, for example - of a functioning
government does not present a special case entitling the United Nations
29
to invoke the civil war IHL regime.

the United Nations may not operate under a mandate to serve merely as an arm of the
government of a state in a civil war. See supra note 113 (discussing the scope of UNEF and
ONUC mandates). This would cause the United Nations to fundamentally interfere in the
political balance within the state, which it can not do. Id. Moreover, a third state which
intervenes pursuant to the invitation of a host state must conform its actions to the scope of the
invitation, whereas consent to U.N. intervention is predicated on an implied freedom of action
on the part of the Organization. See Franck, United Nations Law in Africa: The Congo
Operationas a Case Study, supra note 113, at 638-52. The "absolutist" view of sovereignty
that allows a de facto government to define what constitutes interference in the internal affairs
of the state is evident in U.N. recognition practice, see Fox, supra note 111,
and U.N. organs
have found specifically that the determination of the substantive political order within a state
falls within the sovereign domain and therefore outside of the domain of the international
community and U.N. jurisdiction. See supra note 111.
However, the authority of the government
to act for all political factions within a state so as to define the political order of the state is
limited by the emerging democratic entitlement and its corollary principle of popular sovereignty. See Franck, supra note 111; Fox, supra note 111. Some commentators argue that the United
Nations. is in fact interfering in the internal affairs and with the political order of those states
in which it intervenes. However, it is sufficient for the purposes of this article to note that such
interference, to the extent that it occurs, does so pursuant to rules of international law and not
through deference to the political order established by adefacto government. See, e.g., Gordon,
supra note 124. Thus, the possibility of intervention by invitation and consequent invocation
of the civil war IHL regime within the realm of the sovereign domain remains unavailable.
128. Customary law obligations substantially equivalent to those set forth in common article
3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 are held to unilaterally bind government and insurgent
forces in civil war. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
218-19 (June 27), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986); Solf, supra
note 64, at 294-95. However, it is not clear how rebel forces can be considered bound to an
international law norm when they, short of achieving status as a belligerent, are not considered
subjects of international law. See Charles Lysaght, The Scope of Protocol II and Its Relations
to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Other Human Rights Instruments,
33 AM. U. L. REv. 9, 12 (1983-84). Such a weakness in theory demonstrates the inherent
oversimplicity of the "two subjects of international law" test.
129. Where the United Nations has exercised governmental functions, its "interference"
with regard to the political order of the state in question ostensibly was limited to the promotion
of democratic process, not the prescription of rules within the democratic framework intended
to favor one party over another. Nonetheless, the United Nations' role does necessarily favor
certain factions at the expense of others. See Steven R. Ratner, The Cambodia Settlement
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As a creature of international law, the United Nations has no "sovereignty," no "internal political order" or domaine rdserv9 that it can claim
is protected from the intrusion of international law.' 30Where international
law would otherwise apply, the mere fact that the United Nations is
involved does not render it inapplicable.
In accordance with the foregoing analysis, the United Nations may not
treat as criminal the actions of rebel forces who attack U.N. forces by
reference to prescriptions of the host state, because no host state can have
jurisdiction to prescribe rules for a relationship which is governed by the
mandatory rules of international law. A "host" state may not "waive" its
own absence of jurisdiction; nor can the United Nations "waive" the
absence of the state's, jurisdiction or "consent" to the exercise of that
state's jurisdiction because the allocation of jurisdiction is determined by
the international community as a whole.131 Moreover, the United Nations,
as a single subject of international law, does not itself have the customary
lawmaking power to change the legal regime by which such jurisdiction
132
is allocated.

Agreements, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 12-14, 22-25 (1993) (Cambodian sovereignty vested i'n the
Supreme National Council involving all factions; U.N. had authority to override SNC with
respect to civil administration "to the extent necessary to ensure the strict neutrality of the
elections and to create the proper environment for holding them[.]"); Fox, supra note 111, at
575-76 (sovereignty of West Irian held by Netherlands and Indonesia jointly during the
transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule; the U.N. played nothing more than a monitoring role).
130. "Sovereignty" exists as an attribute of states, distinct from the attributes of an
international organization. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
287-88 (1990) (Sovereignty and Equality of States); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, §

223, cmt. a (international organizations "do not exercise powers implied in statehood and state
sovereignty").
131. Cf. Strauss, supra note 107 (in the context of private international law, discussing the
jurisdiction to adjudicate established by international law and why dualism can not be applied
to allow states to direct their own courts not to apply the international law of jurisdiction).
132. Id. The allocation of jurisdiction between the sovereign and domestic realms is a
function of customary law. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, pt. IV, introductory note.
While the United Nations, as a subject of international law, see Blain Sloan, General Assembly
-Resolutions Revisited (Forty Years Later), 58 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 39, 133 (1987), is capable
of a customary lawmaking act not in conformity with existing law, see D'AMATO, supra note
48, at 60 (describing an act that violates customary law as having the "seeds" of a new rule of
law), the law can not be deemed changed without the implied consent of the community of
states. In the words of Watson:
the power to make authoritative interpretations of Article 2(7) has not been yielded
by states to the political organs of the United Nations and that . . . power of
autointerpretation thus still rests with the member states[.] . . . [A]lthough other
articles may be amenable to alternate modes of interpretation, a positivistic approach
is necessitated by the unique nature of Article 2(7) as the intersection of both law
and politics on the one hand, and domestic versus international jurisdiction on the
other.... [W]hile one may adopt a dynamic approach toward lesser substantive rules,
one cannot do so in connection with a principle that forms the basis for the overall
allocation of competence within the system.
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As a matter of substantive IHL, it is conceivable that the Security
Council could create a lex specialis that would allow the United Nations
to treat attacks upon itself as criminal and mandate application by its own
forces of the internal IHL regime. 133 There is disagreement, however, over
the existence of the Security Council's legislative power'3 and jurisdiction. 135 Moreover, the substance of such a rule would necessarily be
premised on just the sort of utilitarian analysis prohibited by IHL, vis-i6-vis
that peace and security may be sought through the diminution of humanitarian rights for those in armed conflict. 36 In addition, any ability of the
Security Council to change humanitarian law should not enable the
Organization to abrogate peremptory norms that the international com37
munity could not also negate through the process of customary law making.

Watson, supra note 113, at 60. It seems unlikely that there will be endorsement by the
international community of a great expansion of the sovereign realm to the detriment of the
international community's own jurisdictional reach, and without such endorsement, no change
in customary law can result. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 102, cmts. b-c.
133. A decision of the Council under Chapter VII would be binding on all U.N. members
pursuant to article 25 of the Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
134. A legislative act is a prescriptive act that can change directly the status of persons
and things. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, pt. 4, introductory note, § 401; see also
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (establishing
Rwandan Tribunal, and effectively legislating the applicability of Protocol II to Rwanda, which
is not a party to Protocol II); S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 298 1st mtg. IM 17, 29, U.N.
Doc. S/Res/687 (1991) (The Security Council arguably exercised legislative power when it
"[d]ecide[d] that all Iraqi statements made since 2 August 1990 repudiating its foreign debt are
null and void[.]"); Paul C. Szasz, New Ideas to Help Eliminate Nuclear Weapons, DISARMAMENT
TIMES, Nov. 24, 1992, at 570 (proposing Security Council "legislation" to prohibit further
nuclear testing by states). But cf. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuantto Paragraph2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., . 29, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993)
(pointing out that in establishing a tribunal for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of humanitarian law, "the Security Council would not be creating or purporting to
'legislate' that law.").
135. Under Chapter VII, there must exist a "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression" pursuant to which the Security Council may decide "what measures shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39 (emphasis added). Article 41 states that "The Security Council
may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decision, and may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such
measures[.]" Id. art. 41; see generally Watson, supra note 113; Franck, The "Powers of
Appreciation": Who is the Ultimate Guardianof U.N. Legality?, supra note 113.
The Article 25 obligation to abide by decisions of the Security Council is a treaty
obligation among U.N. members, but one that binds virtually all members of the international
community as a function of the almost universal membership in the United Nations. See U.N.
CHARTER art. 25; supra note 16. Pursuant to Article 103, where there is a conflict between "the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations
under any other internationalagreement, their obligations under the present Charter prevail."
U.N. CHARTER, art. 103 (emphasis added). It remains unclear whether a decision of the Security
Council can modify or override customary IHL.
136. See supra notes 11-48 and accompanying text.
137. For example, the Security Council should not be able to promulgate a rule providing
that no quarter be given a peremptory rule of international law. See supra note 12 and
accompanying text.
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On December 9, 1994, without a vote, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted and opened for signature a Convention on the Safety of United
Nations and Associated Personnel. 38 As of November, 1995, thirty-five
states have signed the treaty and four states have ratified or acceded to
it. 139The Convention purports to, interalia, modify substantive IHL norms
so as to criminalize attacks on U.N. peacekeepers otherwise protected by
the combatant's privilege. While the Convention may ultimately achieve
this goal, it can only do so to the extent that it serves as a medium for the
modification of customary international law. The Convention may not
modify substantive norms of IHL simply as a treaty operational between
the parties thereto. While the acts of states in speaking for and voting for
the adoption of a General Assembly resolution are traditionally held, in
and of themselves, not to constitute sufficient state practice or evidence
of opinio juris to crystallize a new rule of customary law, ratification of
a treaty and other more substantial "acts" of conforming practice may
evidence the emergence of a new customary rule, depending on the
number and identities of the treaty parties. 40
By its terms, the Convention purports to modify existing IHL rules.
Article 1 of the Convention establishes a category of persons denoted
"United Nations personnel," which includes both military and civilian
personnel. 4 ' Under the Convention, both military and civilian personnel
are declared immune from attack. 142 The Convention effectively repeals
the combatant's privilege: 143 soldiers in the field who attack U.N. military

138. See Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note
104.
139. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the'Secretary-General, Status as at 31 December
1994, supra note 15, Supplement. By its terms, the Convention enters into force 30 days after
the deposit of 22 instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. Convention on
the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 104, art. 27, 34 l.L.M. at
493.
140. See generally D'AMATO, supra note 48; see also STEPHEN M. SCHWEBEL, THE LEGAL
EFFECT OF RESOLUTIONS AND CODES OF CONDUCT OF THE UNITED NATIONS 3 (Forum

Internationale No. 7, 1985) (evidencing a traditional view that looks principally to the practice
of states and does not look to their "practice" as members of the General Assembly). But see
Sloan, supra note 132 (taking a less traditional approach and arguing for consideration of state
practice within the U.N. and consideration of elements of the resolutions themselves in the
analysis of whether or not a resolution is law creating).
141. Convention Article 1 states that "[flor the purposes of this Convention: (a) 'United
Persons engaged or deployed by the Secretary-General of the
Nations personnel' means: (i)
United Nations as members of the military, police or civilian components of a United Nations
operation." Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note
104, art. 1(a), 34 I.L.M. at 486.
142. Article 7 provides that "United Nations and associated personnel, their equipment and
premises shall not be made the object of attack or of any action that prevents them from
discharging their mandate." Id. art. 7(1).
143. See supra notes 68, 70, 72 and accompanying text.
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personnel pursuant to the orders of their commanders are deemed to be

committing a crime for which individual criminal liability is established.'"
In aid of prosecution, various Convention provisions address the sharing
of information, extradition, and other forms of mutual assistance among
the treaty parties. 14 5 The Convention relies on States Parties for adjudication and enforcement based on the exercise of state jurisdiction.146 To the
extent that the substantive violations established by the Convention
become universally recognized as serious violations, resort by states to
universal jurisdiction should be 'available as well.' 47
The Convention does address, indirectly, the different roles played by
military and non-military forces in armed conflict, stating that "military
and police components of a United Nations operation and their vehicles,
144. -Article 9 provides:
The intentional commission of:
(a) A murder, kidnapping or other attack upon the person or liberty of any
United Nations or associated personnel;
(b) A violent attack upon the official premises, the private accommodation or
the means of transportation of any United Nations or associated personnel likely to
endanger his or her person or liberty;
(c) A threat to commit any such attack with the objective of compelling a
physical or juridical person to do or to refrain from doing any act;
(d) An attempt to commit any such attack;
(e) An act constituting participation as an accomplice in any such attack, or in
an attempt to commit such attack, or in organizing or ordering others to commit such
attack,
shall be made by each State Party a crime under its national law.
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 104, art. 9,
34 I.L.M. at 488.
145. See, e.g., id. arts. 11 (prevention of crimes against United Nations and associated
personnel, 12 (communication of information), 13 (measures to ensure prosecution or extradition), 14 (prosecution of alleged offenders), 15 (extradition of alleged offenders), 16 (mutual
assistance in criminal matters), 34 I.L.M. at 489-91.
146. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, §§ 402, 404, 421 with Convention

on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 104, art. 10, 34 I.L.M.
at 488-89, the text of which is as follows:
Establishmentof Jurisdiction
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the crimes set out in article 9 in the following cases:
(a) When the crime is committed in the territory of that State or on board a ship
or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State.
2. A State Party may also establish its jurisdiction over any such crime when it is
committed:
(a) By a stateless person whose habitual residence is in that State; or
(b) With respect to a national of that State; or
(c) In an attempt to compel that State to do or to abstain from doing any act.
147. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 404 & cmt. a (A state may "define and
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of
universal concern[.]").
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vessels and aircraft shall bear distinctive identification."'148 This meets the
IHL test requiring combatants to display a "fixed distinctive sign, recognizable at a distance."' 49 Nonetheless, the Convention is marred by the
same wilful confusion over the role of IHL and U.N. status vis-h-vis other
parties to armed conflict. Convention signatories continue to traffic in the
illusion that the international community can unilaterally prescribe the
conduct of another combatant. The Convention purports to modify
humanitarian law by ignoring the "de facto armed conflict" predicate of
IHL and by defining certain armed conflicts as falling within the Convention's protections -and certain armed conflicts as falling without them.'
The Convention contains an IHL "savings clause," but it is a savings
clause which itself raises questions. It reads as follows:
Nothing in this Convention shall affect: (a) The applicability of
international humanitarian law and universally recognized standards
of human rights as contained in international instruments in relation
to the protection of United Nations operations and United Nations
and associated personnel or the responsibility of such personnel to
respect. such law and standards.' 5'
To the extent that the words "as contained in international instruments"
are words of limitation, they again sidestep the fact that the United
Nations is bound by customary obligations with what appears to constitute
an oblique reference to the "principles and spirit" of IHL. 52 Moreover,
language found in international agreements purporting to limit U.N.
obligations to those constituting the "principles and spirit" of IHL is only
relevant to a discussion of U.N. customary obligations to the extent that
such language affects opiniojurisor practice. With regard to the operation
of the savings clause, the question remains as to whether the Convention
purports to modify the U.N.'s customary IHL obligations and whether it
has done so. It is the author's conclusion that, to date, an insufficient

148. Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note
104, art. 3(1), 34 I.L.M. at 487; see supra notes 72-73, 92 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 70.
150. Article 2 states that the Convention does not apply to a United Nations operation
"authorized by the Security Council as an enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter
of the United Nations in which any of the personnel are engaged as combatants against
organized armed forces and to which the law of international armed conflict applies."
Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra note 104, art. 2(2),
34 I.L.M. at 486. This ignores the applicability of IHL to U.N. forces engaged in defacto armed
conflict when acting in "self defense" under Chapter VI and VII mandates. On the other hand,
it is another acknowledgment by the United Nations that IHL does apply to U.N. forces engaged
in armed conflict authorized under Chapter VII.
151. Id. art. 20(a), 34 I.L.M. at 491.
152. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
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number of states have ratified the Convention and there is insufficient
practice in conformity with the Convention to conclude that customary
IHL law has been modified so as to limit the combatant's privilege
applicable to attacks on U.N. forces. While the Convention's approach
ostensibly draws on the U.N.'s peacekeeping experience with status of
forces agreements,' 53 which obligate the host state to protect and prosecute
attacks on U.N. personnel,' 54 these status of forces agreements must suffer
from the same jurisdictional infirmities that limit the effect of the Convention itself, because an agreement with the United Nations is itself a form
of treaty.
The Convention purports to be effective between the parties even if
a host state is not a party to the Convention. 55 This can not be so, because
all of the beneficiaries of IHL are not party to the agreement, whether they
be the protected parties or the states constituting the members of the
international community and owed the obligations of IHL as customary
obligations erga omnes. Although the Geneva Conventions of 1949156
operate between the parties as a matter of conventional law even when
other parties to the armed conflict are not so obligated, they do not purport
157
to limit the customary law rights of treaty non-parties.
E. Why the HumanitarianObligationsof Troop
Contributing States May Not Satisfy the
United Nation's Own IHL Obligations
The United Nations further argues that troop contributing states are
directly responsible for IHL violations committed by their contingents,
implying that state obligations in some way supplant the IHL obligations
of the United Nations. 158 This argument relies on a mischaracterization of

153. Comprehensive Review, supra note 101, at 2 n.d.
154. See supra note 101; Elaboration Pursuant to Paragraph I of General Assembly
Resolution 48/37 of 9 December 1993, of an InternationalConvention Dealing with the Safety
and Security of United Nations and Associated Personnel, with Particular Reference to
Responsibilityfor Attacks on Such Personnel:Note by the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR 242d
Ad Hoc Comm., 48th Sess., Agenda Item 5, 9, U.N. Do. A/AC.242/I (1993); cf. Report of
the Ad Hoc Committee, U.N. GAOR Ad Hoc Comm. on the Elaboration of an Int'l Conv.
Dealing with the Safety & Security of U.N. & Associated Personnel, 48th Sess.
20, 23, at
16, 17, U.N. Doc. A/AC.242/2 (1994).
155. See, e.g., Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, supra
note 104, art. 1(d) (defining "host state" without reference to Convention membership).
156. Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 4.
157. The fact that almost every state is a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 makes
this a theoretical example and not a practical likelihood. See supra note 16.
158. See, e.g., Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (I), supra note 11, '1114;
Palwankar, supra note 3, at 230 (discussing a U.N. memorandum on the application and
dissemination of the Geneva Conventions, dated Nov. 10, 1961). Evident again is the tendency
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the legal relationships that exist between troop contributing states and
those parties in conflict with U.N. forces, and between the United Nations
and troop contributing states. Moreover, the position advocated by the
United Nations would result in a total breakdown in the command and
control structure of the U.N. force, rendering it ineffective.' 5 9
The IHL paradigm establishes responsibility as afunction ofcommand
and control. The existing humanitarian paradigm must hold the United
Nations alone internationally responsible for violations committed by
troops under its command and control. Only an entity that exercises
command and control over military forces can order or fail to order
compliance with humanitarian law, for example, what weapons are to be
used, how civilian targets are to be avoided, and how prisoners of war and
the wounded are to be treated."W The United Nations exercises exclusive

of the United Nations to define general issues and solutions involving IHL in terms of the
various humanitarian conventions, which the Organization asserts that it can not join, see supra
notes 50-55 and accompanying text, without mention of its customary obligations.
159. See, e.g., Improving the Capacity of the United Nations for Peace-Keeping: Report
of the Secretary General, supra note 2, 26, at 7; ComprehensiveReview of the Whole Question
of Peace-Keeping Operations in All Their Aspects, U.N. GAOR Special Comm. on PeaceKeeping Operations, 49th Sess., Item 81 of Preliminary List, in 23, 29-30, 56, at 6-7, 11, U.N.
Doc. A/49/136 (1994). In a statement pertaining to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)
in the Sinai, the Secretary-General stated, "the Force is necessarily under the exclusive command
of the United Nations, vested in the Secretary-General under the control of the Security Council.
...A departure from this principle would seriously endanger the impartiality of the United
Nations and of the operation." First Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Implementation of
Security Council Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960, supra note 113, 7; see Remarks of Cpt.
Ashley Roach, supra note 99; cf. High Command Case, supra note 4, at 516 (noting the
objection of certain German High and Field Commanders that implementation of illegal orders
would destroy the army's discipline).
160. See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 4, art. 3, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. at 93, DOCUMENTS
ON THE LAWS OF WAR at 46 ("A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said
Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible
for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces."); ICRC GENEVA (IV)
COMMENTARY, supra note 76, art. 1, at 16 ("It would not, for example, be enough for a State
to give orders or directions to a few civilian or military authorities, leaving it to them to arrange
as they pleased for their detailed execution. It is for the State to supervise the execution of the
orders it gives"). Kamenov notes the customary law character of this principle. See Tihomir
Kamenov, The Origin of State and Entity Responsibility for Violations of International
HumanitarianLaw in Armed Conflicts, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW 169, 174 (Frits Kalshoven & Yves Sandoz eds., 1989).
In Military and ParamilitaryActivities in and Against Nicaragua,the International Court
of Justice discussed the issue of international responsibility under IHL as a function of command

and control. The Court stated that it had to "determine ... whether or not the relationship of
the contras to the United States was so much one of dependence on the one side and control
on the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of
the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of that Government." Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 109 (June
27), reprintedin 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986). The same issue is raised where state contingents fall
under U.N. command. According to Nicaragua's assertions concerning the relationship between
the Contras and the United States, "any offenses which [the contras] have committed would
be imputable to the Government of the United States, like those of any otherforces placed under
the latter's command." Id. 1 114 (emphasis added). Ultimately, the Court did not find present
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command and control over all troops comprising its forces, which are
recruited and organized as national contingents.' 6' As a consequence of
its command and control, the United Nations is deemed a party to armed
conflict and thereby subject to the obligations of IHL. In contrast, as a
consequence of their lack of control, troop contributing states are neither
parties to the armed conflict nor directly responsible for the actions of
U.N. armed forces. 62 Were it otherwise, it would certainly be quite a
surprise to those states who consent to the introduction of U.N. forces into
their territory, only to learn that they have actually consented to the
introduction of an assortment of national forces from the various contributing states. Again, the U.N. position makes no sense in the context of the

existing paradigm of humanitarian law.
Although troop contributing states are not parties to the armed conflict,

this does not provide a superior orders defense for the actions of state

those characteristics of command necessary to attribute to the United States the acts of the
contras. The Court determined that the United States had not "devised the strategy and directed
the tactics" of the Contra operations, id. I 110, had not "directed or enforced the perpetration
of ...acts contrary to humanitarian law," id. 115, and had not exerted "effective control of
the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were
committed," id., any one of which would be necessary for attribution of Contra acts to the
United States. In contrast, the U.N. command and control structure does exercise each one of
these controlling functions with respect to state troop contingents and would thereby incur
liability for the Organization in the event that IHL violations were to occur in the course of an
operation.
161. See supra note 2.
162. See Hague Convention (IV), supra note 4, arts. 1, 3, Annex, arts. 1,3, 2 AM. J. INT'L
L. at 92-93, 97-98, DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR at 46, 48; Geneva Conventions of 1949,

supra note 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3148, 3250, 3420, 3618, 75 U.N.T.S. at 64, 116, 238, 388 (arts. 51,
52, 131, and 148, respectively); supra notes 69-84 and accompanying text. This conclusion is
in accord with U.N. practice. For example, in response to Morocco's threats to withdraw from
ONUC yet remain in the Congo until the U.N. changed its approach to the various other
conflictive parties there, the Secretary-General made clear that as incorporated into ONUC, troop
contingents were no longer considered organs of their contributing states, but that the presence
of such troops, outside of ONUC, would have consequences for Morocco, the contributing state.
He stated:
Were a national contingent to leave the United Nations Force, they would have to
be regarded as foreign troops introduced into the Congo, and the Security Council
would have to consider their continued presence in the Congo, as well as its
consequences for the United Nations operation, in this light.
U.N. SCOR, 15th Sess., 896th mtg. 1 109, U.N. Doc. S/PV.896 (1960). Similarly, the United
Nations alone entered into an agreement settling claims by Belgian nationals against the United
Nations for damage to persons and property arising out of U.N. operations in the Congo, thereby
implying that such damage Was not caused by an individual troop contributing state. See
Agreement Relating to the Settlement of Claims Filed Against the United Nations in the Congo
by Belgium Nationals, supra note 5 (specifically excluding claims arising from military
necessity). Similarly, it was the United Nations that paid a sommeforfaitaire to the ICRC on
behalf of ICRC personnel killed in the Congo where the evidence implied that they were killed
by U.N. forces. The United Nations made the payment without admitting any legal or financial
liability. See SEYERSTED, supra note 2,at 195. In contrast, the United Nations paid no claims
in connection with the Korean conflict.
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contingents, 63 because troop contributing states are responsible to the
United Nations by virtue of their contribution agreements with the United
Nations and the U.N. regulations governing the force.6' Individual
responsibility exists for any member of a U.N. armed force who commits
an act constituting a war crime.1 65 In addition, the troop contributing states,
as non-parties to the conflict, remain obligated "to ensure respect" for
IHL.'66 The obligation to observe U.N. command and control never
requires a state contingent to execute U.N. orders' 67 that violate IHL.
Analysis of U.N. responsibility with reference to the International Law
Commission's draftcode of state responsibility supports the view that the
United Nations alone is directly responsible for violations of IHL by the
troop contingents comprising its armed forces." The draft articles and
commentary link the concepts of control and responsibility in several code
69
sections dealing with various permutations of interstate relationships,'
and expressly address the issue of armed contingents. 70

163. See generally D.H.N. Johnson, The Defense of Superior Orders, 9 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L
L. 291 (1985).
164. See infra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 92.
166. The ICJ concluded that the obligation "to ensure respect" for humanitarian law "does
not derive only from the [Geneva] Conventions themselves, but from the general principles of
humanitarian law to which the [Geneva] Conventions merely give specific expression." Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 220
(June 27), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986); Theodor Meron concludes that the erga omnes
nature of conventional humanitarian norms implies a similar duty as a matter of customary law.
See Meron, supra note 6, at 355 & n.24; cf. Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict (I),
supra note 5,- 82, at 31 (citing Gerald G. Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties,
U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Agenda Item 2, U 125-26, U.N. Doc. A.CN.4/107 (1957), reprinted
in [1957] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 16, 54, U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1957/Add.I, U.N. Sales
No. 59.V.5.vol.II); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, §§ 702 cmt. o, 703(1-2) & n.3
(regarding human rights). Kamenov speaks of semi-direct responsibility originating for the
United Nations "on the ground of obligation 'to ensure respect,' " under Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions. See Kamenov, supra note 160, at 189.
167. See supra note 163.
168. See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-First
Session, U.N. GAOR,.34th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 239, U.N. Doc. A/34/10 (1979), reprinted
in [1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, at 1,91, U.N. Doc. AICN.4ISER.A11979/Add.1 (Part
2), U.N. Sales No. E.80.V.5 (Part II); see also Kamenov, supra note 160, at 187-93.
169. The draft code, by its terms, deals with "state" responsibility; however, the United
Nations is not immune from IHL obligations simply because it is not a state. See supra notes
11-48 and accompanying text. The draft code corroborates the link between command and
control and responsibility in the context of state obligations. Draft Article 9 mentions the
provision of an organ of an international organization to. a state and not the reverse, but the
principle remains the same.
170. See Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its TwentySixth Session, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/9610/Rev.1 (1974), reprinted
in [1974] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 1, at 157,288, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1974/Add.l (Part
One), U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.7 (Part I) (discussing situations in which a third state sends troops
to aid a government facing rebellion where the third state retains command and control over
its troops).
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Draft article 9 deals expressly with the situation in which a state or
international organization places an organ at the disposal of another
state,171 a situation analogous to the furnishing of troop contingents to the
United Nations. Article 9 attributes the conduct of the borrowed governmental organ to the borrowing state as a function of the control exercised
over that borrowed governmental organ by the borrowing state. The
borrowing state is deemed responsible so long as "[the borrowed] organ
was acting in the exercise of elements of the governmental authority of
72
the State [read 'United Nations'] at whose disposal it has been placed."'
Whether troop contingents are acting in the capacity of U.N. organs is a
question of fact.'7 The commentary to draft article 9 expressly states that
article 9 does encompass situations in which a state,
genuinely places at the disposal of another State [United Nations] a
contingent of its own armed forces, so that the other State [United
Nations] may employ that contingent under its authority and control
and assign it to tasks which may involve the exercise of elements of
74
the beneficiary State's [United Nations'] governmental authority.
The commentary distinguishes the case in which one state sends military
contingents to assist the military of another state, where the military
contingents rendering assistance are not "placed at the disposal" of the
other state, and instead, remain under the control of the sending state and
continue to "act under its [the sending state's] orders, control and instructions."' 7' Thus, draft article 9 supports the view that the acts of state
military contingents furnished to the United Nations are attributable to the

171. The text of draft Article 9 is as follows:
Article 9. Attribution to the State of the conduct of organs placed at its disposal by

another State or by an international organization.
The conduct of an organ which has been placed at the disposal of a State by
another State or by an international organization shall be considered as an act of the
former State under international law, if that organ was acting in the exercise of
elements of the governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it has been
placed.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-FirstSession, supra note

168, at 239, reprinted in [1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 91.
172. Id.

173. See Summary Records of the 1211th Meeting, [1973] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 46, 47,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A1I973, U.N. Sales No. E.74.V.4; cf. United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 35 (24 May).
174. See Report of the Commission to the GeneralAssembly on the Work of Its Twenty-

Sixth Session, supra note 170, 12, at 125, reprinted in [1974] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 288
(discussing situation in which a third state sends troops to aid a government facing rebellion
where the third state retains command and control over its troops).
175. Id.I 11.
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United Nations where those military contingents are acting under the
command and control of the United Nations.
Draft article 5 also supports U.N. responsibility for the acts of state
troop contingents. Under draft article 5, the acts of state organs are
attributed to the state so long as the organ in question "ha[s] that status
under the internal law of that State" and "provided that organ was acting
in that capacity in the case in question."' 76 U.N. forces are analogous to
state forces within the meaning of this provision when U.N. forces,
including their component state contingents, are constituted as subsidiary
organs of the United Nations under the Charter and under the Organization's internal regulations'7 - the "internal law" of the United Nations.
Viewed from the perspective of the troop contributing state, draft
articles 9 and 5 address the circumstances in which the acts of a state
contingent may not be attributed to the contributing state, supporting U.N.
responsibility by negative implication. When a troop contingent is acting
in the capacity of a U.N. organ for the purposes of draft articles 9 and 5,
it can not also be acting in the capacity of an organ of the contributing
state. 178
In accordance with draft article 10, the United Nations should be
responsible for the rogue acts of state contingents on loan to the United
Nations and otherwise under U.N. command and control, so long as the
rogue acts were not carried out pursuant to the commands of the troop
contributing state. 179 This comports with the customary law rules by which

176. Draft Article 5 states:
For the purposes of the present articles, conduct of any State organ [the troop
contingents] having that status under the internal law of that State [the United
Nations] shall be considered as an act of the State concerned [United Nations] under
international law, provided that organ was acting in that capacity in the case in
question.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-FirstSession, supra note
168, at 239, reprinted in [1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 91.
177. For example, the General Assembly created UNEF I as a subsidiary organ of the
General Assembly as authorized under Charter Article 22. See G.A. Res. 1000, U.N. GAOR,
Emergency Special Sess., pt. 1, Supp. No. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956); see also Regulations Governing United Nations Force in the Congo, supra note 2; Certain Expenses of the
United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 170-71, 175-77 (20 July). The United Nations force in the
Congo (ONUC) was constituted as an organ of the Security Council as authorized by Charter
Article 29. See S.C. Res. S/4387, supra note 2, at 16; Regulations Governing United Nations
Force in the Congo (ONUC), supra note 2, arts. 5-6; Certain Expenses of the United Nations,
1962 I.C.J. at 151; see also, Model Agreement, supra note 2, 4.
178. See Kamenov, supra note 160, at 188 (rejecting the possibility that the United Nations
and a troop-contributing state could share direct responsibility under IHL).
179. Article 10 states:
The conduct of an organ [the contributed troop contingent] of a State, of a territorial
governmental entity or of an entity empowered to exercise elements of the govern-
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a state bears international responsibility for the rogue acts of contingents
otherwise under its own command and control. 8 The argument under

article 10 takes as a starting point the functioning of contingents as
subsidiary organs of the United Nations, acting under its command and
control. In that context, the United Nations is held responsible when one

of its troop contingents commits an internationally wrongful act contrary
to U.N. regulations or instructions.''
Of course, U.N. responsibility presupposes that the troop contingent's
rogue acts were not performed pursuant to the supervening commands of
the troop contributing state. Where the troop contributing state reasserts
de facto operational command and control over its troop contingent, it
renders itself a party to the armed conflict, becoming directly responsible
for the acts of its contingent, whether or not it acts in violation of U.N.
regulations governing the force or in violation of an international agreement with the United Nations. 8 2 This, too, is true as a matter of customary
IHL, 183 and brings the acts of the state and its contingent within the
provisions of draft articles 9 and 5.'84
There are many possible consensual arrangements for the sharing of
control over armed forces, discussion of which exceeds the scope of this
article. But as a category, violations of IHL that occur in the context of
operations in which the United Nations and a troop contributing state
mental authority [United Nations], such organ [troop contingent] having acted in that
capacity, shall be considered as an act of the State [United Nations] under international law even if, in the particular case, the organ [troop contingent] exceeded its
competence according to internal law [U.N. regulations governing the force] or
contravened instructions [of U.N. commanders] concerning its activity.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-FirstSession, supra note
168, at 239, reprinted in (1979] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n at 91.
180. See MERON, supra note 4, at 155-61.
181. See Commentary'to Article 10, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the
General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 16, U.N. Doc. A/100/10/Rev.l
(1975) (Youmans and Caire cases); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 207, cmt. d & n.4
(attribution to a state of the actions of an official or official body acting under color of
authority).
182. With regard to troop contribution agreements, Kamenov speaks of the lifting of the
U.N.'s "organizational veil" as a consequence of "de facto disregard in a definite manner of
the constitutional agreements for provision of the troops." See Kamenov, supra note 160, at 189.
A state would be deemed to exert de facto control over its contingent to the extent that the
national commander violates the U.N. chain of command by refusing to execute U.N.
instructions without the prior approval of the contributing state government. Such a situation
led to the July 14, 1993 recall of an Italian contingent commander in Somalia. See Julia Preston,
U.N. Removes Italian GeneralImpeding Somalia Operation,WASH. POST, July 15,1993, at A20.
However, it should be noted that a state contingent's refusal to undertake an operation will
rarely result in IHL violations unless the refusal contravenes an affirmative IHL obligation to
act.
183. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 171-77 and accompanying text.
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together "devise the strategy and direct the tactics"' 8 5 or share effective
control,1 6 engage the international responsibility of both the United
Nations and the troop contributing state jointly. 7
I Command and control over U.N. armed forces is legally established
through the regulations governing the forces' and through the troop
contribution agreements between the U.N. and contributing states. 8 9
Where a state has retained defacto command over a contingent resulting
in violations of IHL or where a state's contingent has committed violations
of IHL in the course of rogue acts, breaches of the contribution agreement
and regulations have occurred, and the United Nations is entitled to
demand redress for their violation.19 Redress should include that amount
of compensation from the contributing state necessary to indemnify the
United Nations for reparations that it has to make as a result of its direct
responsibility. 9 ' The United Nations is also under a duty to "ensure
respect" for IHL as a matter of customary law, 92 which may require the
United Nations to demand redress so as to deter breakdown in command
and control and to reduce the incidence of IHL violations. 193 Consultations

185. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 110 (June 27), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023 (1986).
186. Id. 115.
187. See generally Richard R. Baxter, Constitutional Forms and Some Legal Problems of
InternationalMilitary Command, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 325 (1952) (regarding joint coalition
arrangements). In Bosnia, the air strikes carried out by NATO forces implicate the responsibility
of the individual participating states because operational control. rests with those states even
though target selection and determinations regarding the conditions under which the air strikes
are carried out are made by U.N. commanders. See id. at 337; Roger Cohen, NATO Requests
a Broader Right to Attack Targets in Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1994, at A8.
188. As UNEF I was constituted as an organ of the General Assembly, see supra note 177,
the regulations binding UNEF, were issued by the Secretary-General pursuant to the authorization of the General Assembly. See G.A. Res. 1001, U.N. GAOR, 1st Emergency Special Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/3354 (1956). With ONUC, the regulations binding the force,
see Regulations Governing United Nations Force in the Congo (ONUC), supra note 2, were
issued pursuant to the authorization of the Security Council. See Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 175-77 (20 July).
189. See supra note 2. The capacity of the United Nations to enter into international
agreements was affirmed by the International Court of Justice. See Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J. 174, 179 (Apr. 11).
190. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
at 174. As a general matter, international law requires that the violation of international law be
terminated and that reparations be made. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 901.
191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 901; Conditions of Application of

HumanitarianRules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities in which United Nations Forces May Be
Engaged, supra note 3, art. 8, at 469 ("The United Nations is liable for damage which may be
caused by its Forces in violation of the humanitarian rules of armed conflict").
192. See supra note 166.
193. Cf. Conditions of Application of HumanitarianRules of Armed Conflict to Hostilities
in which United Nations Forces May Be Engaged, supra note 3, art. 3(b), at 467 (Where a U.N.
force is composed of national contingents, "effective compliance with the humanitarian rules
of armed conflict must be secured through [the troop contribution agreements.]").
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between the United Nations and the troop contributing state regarding
instances of breakdown in the command structure and efforts to prevent
their reoccurrence may be sufficient to qualify as redress. 1 94 However, if
there exists an ongoing unwillingness on the part of the troop contributing
state to cease or prevent instances in which the state contingent does not
faithfully obey and execute U.N. commands such that future violations are
to demand the
"likely or foreseeable," the United Nations may be required
195
force.
U.N.
the
from
contingent
withdrawal of the state
All troop contributing states are also bound by the obligation "to
ensure respect" for humanitarian obligations, as a matter of both conventional1 96 and customary law, 197 even though they are neither party to
the armed conflict nor directly responsible for IHL violations. As a
consequence, each troop contributing state must seek the termination of
violations by U.N. forces and reparations for the injured parties. 98
Moreover, troop contributing states as well as non-troop contributing states
may be obligated to make some effort to bring about the prosecution of
individuals for war crimes, as a function of their horizontal IHL obligations. 199 To the extent that there exists an ongoing unwillingness on the
part of the Secretary-General or the Security Council to cease or prevent
IHL violations or to provide redress for IHL breaches, a contributing state
may be obligated further to withdraw its contingent from the U.N. force.
Ultimately, attribution of direct international responsibility for IHL
violations to the troop contributing states would destroy the military
effectiveness of any U.N. force. If IHL violations carried out by state
contingents under U.N. orders could render the troop contributing states
194. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 901, cmt. d ("Acknowledgment of a
violation and an apology are common forms of redress[.]"). It may be that any international act
taken with the intent to redress symbolically the wrong done will sufficiently fulfill the

international obligation of redress.
195. In the Nicaragua Case, the ICJ determined that an obligation on the part of the United
States to ensure respect for IHL was breached by the distribution to the Contras of a field
manual that encouraged violations of IHL under circumstances in which the occurrence of such
violations was "likely or foreseeable." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, I 254-56 (June 27), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 1023

(1986).
196. See Geneva Conventions of 1949, supra note 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3114, 3217, 3316, 3516,

75 U.N.T.S. at 31, 85, 135, 287 (common art. 1). 185 states are bound by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, as a matter of conventional law. See supra note 16.
197. See supra note 166.

198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 901. To the extent that U.N. orders
resulting in breaches of IHL violate the troop contribution agreement, the troop contributing
state has another ground upon which it must assert an IHL obligation as a consequence of the
duty to ensure respect for IHL.
199. See supra note 166 (discussing affirmative duty to ensure respect for humanitarian
obligations); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 4, § 404 (Universal Jurisdiction to Define and
Punish Certain Offenses).
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liable for those violations as a party to the armed conflict, all U.N. command decisions would be undermined by the second guessing of the
foreign policy makers of troop contributing states. The result would be
a total breakdown in the command structure that, in combat situations,
would not only diminish the ability of the U.N. force to accomplish its
larger mission, but would also endanger the troops in the field.
Respect for the legal obligations existing between the United Nations
and the troop contributing states, and redress for violations of the same,
,may be politically difficult if not impossible to achieve given the structure
of U.N. forces formed from state contingents. However, solutions to this
problem must involve changes in the way the United Nations is structured
and does business. Solutions may not be based on the subordination of
individual human dignity to U.N. politics in violation of the norms of
humanitarian law. For example, the steps necessary to observe legal
humanitarian obligations may require that states train special units to
function under U.N. control, whether or not pursuant to the mechanism
of Article 43 agreements. Perhaps the obligation to comply with IHL will
necessitate the direct recruitment of U.N. forces, or their recruitment in
some manner that does not leave force contingents susceptible to direct
influence by states, and effectively channels state involvement with the
U.N. force through the political organs of the Organization. Notwithstanding the examples just mentioned, the status quo or alternatives based on
the notion that the ends of a U.N. military mission justify attendant IHL
violations, are simply not permitted.
CONCLUSION

Despite serious alleged violations of IHL by U.N. armed forces, there
exists a curious lack of concern on the part of the international community. Of course, the very process by which U.N. military forces are authorized to engage in armed conflict guarantees that, at the very least, even
the most powerful of nations have an interest in the U.N.'s application of
force. Where U.N. armed forces intervene in what would otherwise
constitute civil war, the intervention is per se predicated on the belief that
international peace and security will be enhanced, thus benefitting all
existing states. On the other hand, those who suffer humanitarian violations from such an operation will by definition be localized in one, two,
or three states, states that are not likely to be major powers. This imbalance between benefit and burden in the calculus of international politics
has, not surprisingly, led to a resounding silence'from the international
community as a whole regarding the systemic problem of IHL violations
by U.N. forces.
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Nevertheless, the United Nations is bound by the rules of customary
IHL, and occupies a horizontal relationship with the other subjects of IHL
with which it is engaged in armed conflict. The fact that the Organization
is so bound does not compromise the vertical relationship that exists
between the Organization and the subjects of international law which it
regulates pursuant to its Charter based powers to make recommendations,
to take binding decisions, or to authorize the use of force as a matter of
the jus ad bellum. Moreover, the application of IHL to U.N. forces will
not compromise the U.N. mission to promote peace.
When U.N. forces engage in military conflict, the Organization
qualifies as a "party to armed conflict" within the meaning of IHL, and
its troops fall within the IHL definition of "combatants." Arguments to
the contrary either deprive IHL concepts of their determinacy or regress
to a claim of special status for the Organization to which it is not entitled.
For the same reasons, U.N. obligations can not be limited to the "principles and spirit" of IHL; the United Nations is bound by the same customary IHL obligations binding upon states.
When U.N. armed forces intervene in civil war situations, they are
bound by the full international IHL regime. The existing allocation of law
making authority between sovereign states on one hand and the international order on the other leaves individual states and the United Nations
without the authority to assert the civil war regime. This allocation of
substantive law making authority can be changed by an international law
making process capable of reallocating law making jurisdiction in the
international system as a whole. Such a reallocation can not be accomplished by way of international treaties effective only between the parties
thereto. In the alternative, the substantive IHL rules pertaining to civil
wars can be changed. The recently adopted Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel did not attempt to reallocate
jurisdiction and has yet to change customary IHL.
U.N. obligations under IHL can not be satisfied by troop contributing
states. By virtue of U.N. command and control, the United Nations alone
is responsible under IHL for the conduct of its forces. Under the existing
IHL paradigm, only an authority that exerts command and control can
require that forces comply with IHL obligations, a view that is supported
by the International Law Commission's draft code on state responsibility.
The notion that troop contributing states could be directly responsible for
actions taken under U.N. command and control would wreck havoc with
the command structure and cripple the effectiveness of any U.N. force,
because the possibility of IHL responsibility would create an incentive for
contributing states to interfere and second guess virtually all operational
instructions.
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It is imperative that the United Nations accept its IHL obligations
fully. Existing problems with Organization funding, the recruitment of
contingents from states, and political discomfort arising out of the
assessment of responsibility for IHL violations can not, as a matter of law,
justify the status quo. To the extent that this requires the United Nations
to cease organizing peacekeeping or peace enforcement forces around
troop contingents contributed by states, that must be done, even if it brings
a halt to peacekeeping in the short term. The principle of humanity may
not be subordinated to political or utilitarian goals. The difficulties
inherent in change must be accepted and will lead ultimately to long term
growth and regeneration of the U.N. peacekeeping role as peacekeeping
operations come to reorganize their efforts to better address humanitarian
concerns.

